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ABSTRACT
This is a study of the nature and development of the law practice  
of John Marshall during his f i r s t  years as a member of the legal pro­
fession .
The work u t i l i z e s  primary source material collected by the ed itor ­
ial s ta f f  of the Papers of John Marshall, together with related court 
records and similar documents. The essence of the study consists of 
the computer-assisted analysis of these sources to gain an understand­
ing of such aspects of Marshall 's law practice as his c l ie n te le ,  the 
nature of the cases he handled, his professional relationships with 
other attorneys, the growth of his practice and the degree of success 
he enjoyed.
The results suggest that Marshall developed a wide and varied 
practice centered on the superior courts in Richmond. Most of his 
l i t ig a t io n  a c t iv i t ie s  consisted of actions related to "debt" causes, 
although he also had a wide fa m i l i a r i t y  with matters pertaining to real 
estate as well as to decedents' estates. Marshall also performed many 
services for his cl ients that went beyond mere legal representation,  
most notably in his roles as land agent and f inancia l counsellor. His 
income and caseload grew s ign i f ican t ly  during the period studied, and 
his success rate was high.
ANATOMY OF A LAW PRACTICE: 
JOHN MARSHALL AT THE BAR — 
THE EARLY YEARS, 1780-1788
"An elderly  gentleman from the country arrived in Richmond one 
morning in the 1780's on serious business. His case was being argued 
before the appeals court, and he needed a lawyer. Not knowing many 
people in the c i t y ,  the country gentlemen asked his landlord, the owner 
of the Eagle Hotel, who was the best advocate in the c i ty .  The answer 
was quick in coming: John Marshall. But when the prospective c l ient
saw Marshall, he immediately decided against hiring him. What he saw 
was not inspir ing. Marshall did not appear the lawyer type, not at 
a l l .  He was a man of about t h i r t y ,  wearing a plain linen roundabout 
hanging out over his knee breeches and had his hair tied in an unkempt 
queue at the back of his head. Even more ludicrous, he was eating 
cherries from a straw hat he carried under his arm!
"No, this John Marshall, no matter how highly recommended by the 
owner of the Eagle Hotel, was not a f i t  lawyer for the country gentle­
man. The man then went to the courthouse where he struck up a conversa­
tion with the clerk of the court. Explaining his circumstances, the 
country gentleman asked the clerk to recommend a lawyer for him. The 
clerk was happy to oblige. The best young advocate, he said, was John 
Marshall. The country gentleman had been through that once. No, John 
Marshall was not the lawyer for him. He wanted a sophisticated c i ty  
lawyer, not a country bumpkin.
"At that moment, his obvious choice entered: an elder ly  lawyer
wearing a dark coat and a powdered wig. His appearance said he was an 
advocate of rare a b i l i t y ,  and the country gentleman hired him
2.
3.
immediately. He had brought $100 for a lawyer's fee, and he gave $95 
to the man with the powdered wig.
"While waiting for his own case to come up, the country gentleman 
sat in the courtroom listening to the other cases being argued. The 
f i r s t  was between John Marshall and the lawyer in the powdered wig. Im­
mediately, the man from the country realized he had made a serious mis­
take. Marshall was vastly superior to the man to whom he had given his 
$95. When the f i r s t  case was over, the country gentleman approached 
Marshall, explained the events of the day, and asked i f  he would take 
his case for the remaining $5. Marshall agreed. He accepted the $5 
and joked about the power of a powdered wig and a black coat."'*'
This oft-repeated anecdote (possibly apocryphal) is typical of the 
descriptions of the law practice of John Marshall. All commentators 
have agreed that Marshall was an able lawyer, but surprisingly few de­
t a i l s  concerning his early professional career have been brought fo r ­
ward, and until  recently, only meager documentation for his practice
2
has been readily available. This deficiency is rapidly being ad-
3
dressed by the publication of The Papers of John Marshall. Volumes 
covering the years of his law practice (1780-1796) have already been
4
published, and a further volume highlighting the nature of his law 
practice is being readied for publication. The editors of the Marshall 
papers conclude the ir  introductory materials with the exhortation that 
th is collection "should begin a new era concerning Marshall and serve
5
as a point of departure for future generations." With respect to 
Marshall 's law practice, at least, the lure is i r re s is t ib le .  Fully 75 
percent of the documents published in the relevant Marshall volumes
/r
have never before appeared in p r in t .  While they form a fa r  from 
complete record, these documents nevertheless "have brought [John
7
Marshall] the lawyer al ive and enabled us to watch him at work."
Indeed this residuum of legal records, correspondence and other 
o f f i c i a l  and private papers provides a sound basis for the study of
Q
John Marshall 's law practice. Here, the analysis w i l l  conform to 
the time frame suggested by the f i r s t  volume of the Marshall series,  
and study his career from its inception through June of 1788, when 
Marshall became a part ic ipant in the V irg in ia  constitutional ra t i fy ing  
convention. Close scrutiny of the documentation that survives from his 
f i r s t  years at the bar reveals interesting insights into 
eighteenthcentury legal practice, together with important perceptions 




John Marshall 's formal study of the law began while he was immersed
in another important endeavor: serving as an o f f ice r  of the Virg in ia
Continental Line. In the spring of 1780 Marshall was in V irg inia
awaiting further orders. During this time he v is ited his father who
was stationed at Yorktown, and while there decided to attend lectures
on the law to be delivered at the College of William and Mary by the
newly appointed professor of law and police, George Wythe. Marshall
g
began his studies around May 1, 1780.
Wythe's curriculum for law study included two lectures per week, 
supplemented by moot courts and model legislatures held to instruct his 
students in jud ic ia l  and leg is la t ive  proceedings.^ In addition,
Wythe expected his students to read and take notes from the English 
legal classics and from such law reports and collections of statutes as 
were avail a b l e . ^  The only surviving documentation of Marshall 's  
study of the law at William and Mary are his "law notes," which reveal 
Marshall 's careful work at "commonplacing," or abstracting portions of 
such works as Bacon's A New Abridgment of the Laws, the 1769 compil­
ation of Virgina statutes and, occasionally, Sir  William Blackstone's
12Commentaries on the Laws of England. These law notes were never 
completed, and indeed the whole of John Marshall 's legal education
6.
education lasted only three months. By July 29, 1780, Marshall had
13l e f t  William and Mary, never to return as a student. Thus ended
his formal train ing in the law.
Early in August of that same year Marshall passed the bar examina-
14tion and Governor Thomas Jefferson issued his license to practice.
The young lawyer apparently intended to embark upon a legal career in
the county of his b i r th ,  for  on August 28, 1780, he took his oath of
15admission before the Fauquier County Court. However, his legal 
career was quickly transplanted to the state capital at Richmond. In
the spring of 1782 Marshall was elected to the House of Delegates from
Fauquier County. That duty took him to Richmond, and a f ter  his subse­
quent marriage to Polly Ambler of a prominent Richmond family, he estab-
1 filished himself at Richmond to begin the practice of law.
Setting Up an Off ice
One of the f i r s t  and most s ignif icant things that a budding lawyer 
must do is to establish an off ice  from which he can conduct the 
practice of law. While Marshall 's notorious aversion to recordkeeping 
forbids a thorough analysis of the way in which he set about this under­
taking, notations in his account book reveal that he met with certain  
predictable expenses. As early as 1783, Marshall recorded his in­
vestment in two of the indispensable tools of the trade, an inkstand
17and a writ ing desk. The next year saw an outlay of six shil l ings
for paper and, more importantly, the expenditure of over three pounds
for "Dockets." This disbursement was undoubtedly for the purchase of
books to maintain an o f f ice  docket of pending cases, and demonstrates
18the increasing volume of Marshall 's practice. In 1785 he again
purchased a docket, together with the acquisition of such necessary
19items as q u i l ls ,  ink and paper. In te res t ing ly , Marshall also 
invested in a "quire of declarations," which was a small bundle of 
printed declarations H . e_., complaints used in in i t ia t in g  lawsuits) for
u  • 2 0his o f f ice  use.
By the sixth year of his legal career, Marshall 's practice had
apparently increased su f f ic ie n t ly  to move to a larger or perhaps a
better- located of f ice .  In February 1786 Marshall expended a fu l l
twelve pounds "for moving my o f f ice ,"  and nearly another three pounds
21for "paint for the o f f ice ."  Besides routine expenditures for paper
and dockets, the now-established lawyer also invested in a " le t te r
22case" and recorded nearly a pound paid out for postage. By 1787
Marshall was recording twenty entries in his account book for postage
23expenses, to ta l l ing  nearly three pounds. In addition to his usual
off ice  expenses, Marshall again invested in the upgrading of his
o f f ic e ,  this time expending nearly f ive  pounds for "papering and paint-  
24ing the o f f ice ."  During the f i r s t  half of 1788 Marshall continued
his outlay for such necessaries as an inkstand, q u i l ls ,  paper and post-
25age, and added an unexplained purchase of "clerks notes." Mar­
shal l 's  records thus reveal that throughout his f i r s t  eight years of 
practice he was faced with the continuing overhead of maintaining and 
improving the physical accoutrements necessary to a successful practice 
of law.
Nor were the more mundane matters a l l  that occupied Marshall 's 
attention and money in the establishment of his law o f f ice .  Throughout 
this period he also made a signif icant and continuing e f fo r t  to create 
and expand his legal l ib ra ry .  Indeed, some perception of Marshall 's
8.
commitment to his profession can be gleaned from his investment in the
in te l lec tua l  side of the law. He recorded an impressive outlay for
books, most notably in 1785 when he spent inexcess of £50 on his
l ib ra ry ,  including the purchase of a bookcase in which to house his new
legal resources ( th is  expenditure out of a total  income in that year of 
26£750). At one point during that year Marshall found himself paying
27out twenty-five shi l l ings merely for "bringing books in a stage."
In subsequent years, Marshall 's additions to his legal l ib ra ry  appeared
28s ig n i f ican t ly  smaller. This could be a function of his high
i n i t i a l  investment, or possibly i t  was due to Marshall 's declining
attention to detai l  in his recordkeeping as the years wore on.
More interesting are the actual volumes Marshall chose to serve as
his sources of legal reference. Most of his recorded expenditures for
his l ib ra ry  are not specif ic ,  such as the entry recording a certain sum
29"Laid out in Books." But occasionally Marshall 's acquisitions are 
l is ted by t i t l e ,  and this provides insight into the nature of his work­
ing l ib ra ry .  One of the f i r s t  volumes purchased was "Blackstones
30Commintaries," a fundamental legal t reat ise  of the period. In June 
1785, Marshall supplemented this with "Cowpers reports," which were a 
collection of cases heard in the Court of King's Bench in England.
This part icular  entry is enlightening in several ways. Marshall deemed 
Cowper important enough to invest £13-9 in the volumes. His investment 
demonstrates the continuing importance of English precedent in V i r ­
g in ia.  Moreover, Cowper had been published in London in 1783; Marshall
undoubtedly ordered the work shortly af ter  hearing of i ts  publication,
31ref lect ing his desire to remain current in the law. A similar  
purchase of "Browns chancery reports" shows his determination to also
9.
32keep pace with developments in English equity. Marshall was also
quick to acquire the few publications relat ing to Virg in ia  law,
purchasing in 1785 and again in 1787 the most recent collected statutes
33of the commonwealth. In addition to specif ic statutory and case
law, Marshall also invested in such theoret ical  works as Sir Geoffrey
34G i lber t 's  The Law of Evidence and Karnes1 Principles of Equity. At
an even more abstract leve l ,  Montesquieu's The S p ir i t  of the Laws
35became an early addition to the l ib rary .  The enterprising advocate
apparently also sought to polish his s k i l ls  through the purchase of
36B la ir 's  Lectures on Rhetoric. Such purchases suggest that Marshall 
was determined to acquire an in te l lectual  understanding of the law as 
well as a command of the source material and techniques needed in the 
day-to-day combat of l i t ig a t io n .
Clients
Of course the fanciest law off ice  and the most replete l ib ra ry  are 
of l i t t l e  use to a lawyer i f  he has no c l ien ts .  The young John 
Marshall was fortunate in this regard. Although the sketchy nature of 
his records makes any concrete conclusions impossible, i t  is clear that 
Marshall had a wide-ranging and respectable c l ien te le .  The records of 
his f i r s t  eighteen months of practice in Richmond reveal few i d e n t i f i ­
able c l ien ts ,  but by 1784 his practice was brisk. Only six fees were 
registered in 1783, although surviving documentation suggests that 
Marshall had several c l ien ts .  By 1784 Marshall 's account book l is ts  
116 separate fees, and his correspondence indicates an even broader 
c l ien te le .  In his f i r s t  six years of practice in the state capita l ,  
over one thousand d i f feren t  c l ient  names appear in the papers of the 
rising young a t to rn e y .^
10.
Marshall was aided (and his practice was shaped) in his early years
at the bar by connections he had established prior to his admission to
the profession. Marshall 's marriage into the Ambler family was a
fortunate one, and gave him a social standing which was a great asset
38in business and p o l i t ic s .  More important, Marshall was a veteran,
and his former comrades were pa r t icu lar ly  in need of legal assistance
at the time Marshall began his practice. The Continental Congress had
determined to reward soldiers for the ir  services in the Revolution by
awarding them large tracts  of land. The legal snarls evolving out of
the implementation of this policy caused many veterans to turn to
Marshall for help. In addition to assisting veterans with land claims,
Marshall devoted much of his time to obtaining m i l i ta ry  pensions from
39V irg in ia  and the Congress. Marshall la ter  commented: "My
extensive acquaintance in the army was of great service to me . . .  .
My numerous m i l i ta ry  friends . . . took great interest in my favor, and
40I was more successful than I had reason to suspect." While most of
Marshall 's m i l i ta ry  clients are not id e n t i f ia b le ,  occasionally the
records permit a glimpse of th is portion of his practice. The m i l i ta ry
connection was pa r t icu la r ly  prominent in the early years of Marshall 's
career. In 1784 iden t i f iab le  m i l i ta ry  clients were the source of 9
percent of Marshall 's income, while in 1785 he derived f u l l y  17 percent
41of his income from this source.
Another s ignif icant source of revenue for Marshall were cl ients  
from his "home" county of Fauquier. Early in 1785, for example, the 
young lawyer returned to his local constituency. Between February 1 
and March 22 of that year, Marshall recorded fourteen fees as "Reed, 
in Fauquier" to ta l l in g  nearly £40. Similar entries and frequent
11.
expenditures for "going to and & returning from [Fauquier]" also
42attests to Marshall 's continuing connection with that county.
Marshall 's c l ien te le  during these years also included an increasing
number of prominent individuals. As early as 1783 Marshall was
actively representing James Monroe in real estate matters. S im i lar ly ,
in early 1784 he assisted Arthur Lee regarding land warrants in Ken- 
43tucky. In addit ion, Marshall 's account book notes fees received
44from "Squire Lee" (Richard Lee) and "G. Mason j r . "  Early in 1787
the controversial James Wilkinson asked Marshall to help him obtain a
passport from Governor Edmund Randolph for safe passage down the Missis-
45sippi to New Orleans [the request was denied]. Marshall also had a 
"Philadelphia connection" during these years, pa r t icu lar ly  with the 
noted f inancier Robert Morris. In 1787, Marshall represented Morris 
and Thomas W il l ing ,  president of the Bank of North America in Phila­
delphia, in l i t ig a t io n  before the V irg in ia  courts. Later, in 1788,
46Morris placed his Richmond attorney on reta iner .
By the middle of 1788 John Marshall had become well established in 
his chosen profession. He was ensconced in his law o f f ice ,  surrounded 
by a working legal l ib rary  of s ignif icant proportions. His practice 
had developed to the extent that he represented a wide c l ie n te le ,  many 
of whom were leading characters in Virg in ia  and the nation. The nature 
of the law practice generated by that c l ien te le  was s im i la r ly  broad and 
diverse.
CHAPTER TWO 
THE NATURE OF THE PRACTICE
Courts Practiced Before
The varied aspects of John Marshall 's practice, together with the 
complex court structure existing in V irg in ia  during his f i r s t  eight 
years at the bar, brought the young attorney before disparate courts.
An understanding of the nature of Marshall 's practice requires a famil ­
i a r i t y  with V irg in ia 's  jud ic ia l  inst i tut ions of the 1780s.
Prior to the Revolution the structure of the courts in colonial
V irg in ia  had been simple. I t  consisted of county courts composed of
justices of the peace in each county, hustings courts in certain larger 
municipal i t ies ,  and a General Court at Williamsburg manned by the gover­
nor and his council. From time to time the royal governor commissioned 
special courts of vice admiralty to deal with maritime l i t ig a t io n ,  or
special courts of oyer and terminer to handle criminal cases when the
47General Court was overburdened. There were no other courts.
By 1780, however, when John Marshall gained admission to the bar, 
this system had been extensively a ltered, although the V irg in ia  court 
structure was s t i l l  grounded largely on the system of county courts 
which had existed in the colony from i ts  early days. After indepen­
dence, as before, the county courts were the most important tr ibunals  
for most Virginians. These courts conducted the public business of the
counties and heard the great majority of law and equity cases at the ir
12.
13.
48monthly meetings. Also of some importance were the hustings
courts, which were established in such c i t ies  as Williamsburg, Norfolk
and Richmond. These courts handled minor c iv i l  and criminal matters
49and performed many of the same duties as the county courts. Prior
to independence, the decisions of the county courts had been appealable
50to the governor and his council s i t t in g  as the General Court. With 
the coming of independence, however, and the accompanying elimination 
of the royal governor and his General Court, the V irg in ia  legislature  
was faced with the task of erecting a new court system for the state.
The leg is la ture met this challenge by creating a cluster of supe­
r io r  courts at the state level while retaining the system of county 
courts essentia l ly  unchanged. In 1777 the General Assembly erected a 
new court to replace the old General Court. Jurisdiction of this new 
t r ibuna l ,  also named the General Court, was restr ic ted to cases in law 
(as opposed to equity) . I t  was granted orig inal ju r isd ict ion  
(concurrent with the county courts) to hear cases involving more than
£10 currency or two thousand pounds of tobacco, and also served as the
51court of appeals for the county court system. When reconstructing
the ju d ic ia l  system the V irg in ia  legis la ture decided i t  was unwise to
allow ju r isd ic t ion  over law and equity to remain in one panel of
judges. Consequently equity ju r isd ict ion  was placed in a new court,
called the High Court of Chancery. Similar to the General Court, this
new tribunal had both orig inal and appellate ju r isd ic t ion  in equity
cases, giving Virginians a choice of bringing such cases before the
county court or the High Court of Chancery i f  more than £10 were in- 
52volved. In 1776 the General Assembly had also established a Court 
of Admiralty. I ts  ju r isd ic t ion  extended over a l l  maritime cases except
14.
53those involving a capital crime. The legislature i n i t i a l l y  pro­
vided no system of appeals from the decisions of the Admiralty, Chan­
cery and General Courts, but in 1778 i t  organized the highest state 
court, the Court of Appeals. I t  was almost exclusively an appellate
t r ibu na l ,  and i ts  bench was comprised of the judges from the other
54three state courts. Despite the spate of new courts, the county
courts continued to handle the bulk of l i t ig a t io n ,  especial ly in the
55early years of the new system.
This, then, was the structure of the courts during Marshall 's early
career. In 1788, however, discontent with the operation of this
ju d ic ia l  system forced a major revision. Legislation enacted in that
year wrought many changes, the most notable of which was the diversion
56of the General Court ju r isd ic t ion  to eighteen d i s t r ic t  courts.
Many of the cases begun in the General Court during Marshall 's f i r s t  
years of practice were subsequently transferred to the various d is t r ic t  
courts.
The V irg in ia  court system in the 1780s had a d is t inc t ive  two-
t iered nature. By statute ,  lawyers could not practice before both the
57county courts and the General Court. The inevitable  result  of th is
situation was that the better members of the guild natural ly  gravitated
toward the more exciting cases in the state capital while the younger
and lesser members of the profession were "exiled" to county court 
58practice. Thus the better lawyers gathered in Richmond around the
59General Court, the High Court of Chancery and the Court of Appeals.
We have seen that Marshall had f i r s t  been admitted to practice be­
fore the Fauquier County Court, but by the spring of 1782 he had been 
elected to the House of Delegates and transferred his base of
15.
60operations to Richmond. By doing so, Marshall had elected to join
the e l i t e  practice of the Richmond bar. By April 1784 Marshall could
write to Arthur Lee that "I am now standing at the General Court bar 
61. . ." A year la ter  the young so l ic i to r  was admitted to practice
62before the Court of Appeals. He also appeared before the High 
Court of Chancery, and managed at least one case designated 
"admiralty.
The precise number of times in which Marshall appeared before the 
respective courts is obscured by his cryptic method of recordkeeping 
and by the amorphous ju r isd ic t iona l  nature of the courts themselves.
Thus a case taken by Marshall "on appeal" might involve a cause in the
General Court brought up from a county court, a similar  appeal to the
High Court of Chancery, or perhaps an argument before the Court of 
Appeals. Again, however, a careful review of the documents provides in­
formation that sheds some l ight  on this aspect of his practice.  
Marshall 's appearance before a specific court is indisputable in only
about a hundred cases during the period studied. But of those cases,
64nearly eighty percent were before the General Court. Another s ix ­
teen percent of Marshall 's known appearances before a specific court
65were before the High Court of Chancery. Only three cases are
undeniably a t tr ibutable  to the Court of Appeals in this period. There
are also isolated and unexplained references to single cases before the 
Fauquier County Court and the Henrico County Court. I t  should be 
noted, however, that such a narrow sample may be misleading. For 
example, although there are only three specif ic references to the Court 
of Appeals, Marshall 's records note eighty-two cases which he handled 
"on appeal." There is reason to assume that several of these appeals
16.
66were heard before the Court of Appeals. A fu l l e r  picture of the 
nature of Marshall 's practice, i f  not its precise venue, can be found 
by looking to the subject matter of his professional duties.
The specific types of cases that comprised the l i t ig a t io n  of John
Marshall w i l l  be considered in some detail  in the next chapter. How­
ever, Marshall 's practice may be put into perspective by f i r s t  describ­
ing i t  in terms of c lear ly  ascertainable overarching topical areas 
which emerge from the study of his surviving documents.
Cases in Common Law and Chancery
Beginning with the most general of categories, v i r tu a l ly  every case
coming across the desk of young Marshall was either one arising under
the common law, or one in which a remedy was sought in chancery (or a
combination of the two). While the surviving evidence is not always
incontrovertible , i t  is clear that the great majority of Marshall 's
cases arose under the rubric of the common law. Of the nearly eight
hundred cases in which this information is ascertainable, over six
hundred actions (82 percent) came within the common law, while fewer
than 150 cases (18 percent) called upon the ju r isd ict ion  of the 
67chancery courts. This d istr ibut ion supports our e a r l ie r  estimate
of Marshall 's appearances before the courts of common law and chancery,
68thus reinforcing the e a r l ie r  analysis. Marshall 's fee records t e l l
only a s l ig h t ly  d i f ferent  story. Fifteen percent of his recorded fees
can be attr ibuted to chancery cases, but there is a strong probabil i ty
69that th is understates the case.
While the overwhelming majority of cases handled by Marshall arose 
under the common law rather than equity, at times a cause would
17.
generate actions in both areas. I t  w i l l  be recalled that at the
superior court level (the focus of Marshall 's pract ice ) ,  V irg in ia  had
apportioned the ju r isd ic t ion  over law and equity to d i f feren t  courts.
So i t  might at f i r s t  appear implausible that Marshall would record a
fee that c lear ly  mixed the two: "Booker with Tabb & Fields exrs
ch[ancery] and common law £ 7 - 1 2 . " ^  The anomaly is more apparent
than rea l .  I t  was not unusual for the same dispute to embrace both
ju r isd ic t iona l  categories of the law. For example, in Ashby v. Grant,
a Fauquier County case, Grant had won a decision at common law against
Ashby. In response, Ashby, represented by Marshall,  obtained an
injunction from the High Court of Chancery to stay the execution of the
judgment. After hearing "the b i l l ,  answer, Depositions and Arguments
of Counsel on both sides," the court ordered the injunction to be
71dissolved, with costs to be paid by Ashby [Marshall lo s t ] .
S im i lar ly ,  in Duncan & Company v. Dameron & Company, the p l a i n t i f f  had
brought suit on a bond and had received an o f f ice  judgment (a default
72judgment entered by the clerk of the court) .  The bond had been 
burned in a Richmond f i r e ,  and the p l a i n t i f f  thereupon asked the 
General Court to direct the clerk to issue execution (that is ,  to 
enforce the judgment). Marshall,  for the defendant, objected. The 
court agreed, holding that the loss of the bond precluded the p l a i n t i f f  
from proceeding at law, the court "conceiving he might proceed in 
Equity.
Original versus Appellate Practice
Similar to the division between cases in common law and chancery, 
a l l  of John Marshall 's l i t ig a t io n  could be classed as "original"
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actions (those orig inating in the court ult imately  presiding over the
case) or appellate (those cases which were before a court on appeal
from a lower court) .  In his f i r s t  eight years at the bar, Marshall 's
practice leaned heavily toward actions of an "orig inal"  nature. Over
80 percent of his l i t ig a t io n  involved cases which were i n i t i a l l y  f i l e d
in the court ult imately determining the dispute; only 16 percent of
74Marshall 's cases were of an appellate nature.
While the bulk of his practice concerned orig inal cases brought by
declaration ( in  the common law courts) or by b i l l  ( in chancery), even
at th is comparatively early date in his career John Marshall 's work as
an appellate lawyer was growing yearly .  The young attorney's
appellate practice—measured as a percentage of his total  case
load— increased steadily from a low of around 4 percent in 1784 to more
than 16 percent of his practice in 1788. Appellate work measured as a
75percentage of income reveals a similar pattern.
Such information on the extent to which Marshall 's early profes­
sional career was devoted to appellate work can be usefully in te r ­
related with some of the aspects of his career previously discussed.
For example, the or ig ina l-appel la te  dichotomy can shine further l ight  
on the nature of Marshall 's practice before individual courts. The Gen­
eral Court and the High Court of Chancery were the two courts which had 
combined or ig ina l-appel la te  ju r is d ic t ion .  John Marshall 's a c t iv i ty  
before those courts [ in  an admittedly limited sample] reveals that 73 
percent of his appearances before the General Court involved original  
causes of action, while 92 percent of his a c t iv i t ie s  before the High
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76Court of Chancery were of that nature. S im i lar ly ,  a look at the 
county courts which did supply Marshall with cases on appeal provides 
an interesting insight into the geographical d ivers i ty  of his practice.  
Of the eighteen appeals where the lower court was mentioned, f i f tee n  
d i f fe ren t  county courts appear.
Beyond the clear-cut dichotomies of common law chancery and 
or ig ina l -appe l la te ,  much of the law practice of John Marshall seems to 
natural ly  coalesce around several topical categories. Discussion of 
these aspects of his l i f e  as a working lawyer serves to il luminate  
Marshall 's early professional career.
Real Estate Practice
Much of the good fortune John Marshall enjoyed in establishing a 
successful law practice was at tr ibutable  to legal services he provided 
with respect to matters concerning real estate. In developing a s ig n i f ­
icant real estate practice,  Marshall was p a r t icu la r ly  favored by sev­
eral circumstances. We have seen that he had connections with his old 
m il i t a ry  comrades of the Revolution. Many veterans had claims to land 
based on Treasury warrants issued by the Continental Congress as well 
as state warrants issued at Richmond. These warrants were in re a l i t y  
l i t t l e  more than "hunting licenses." The establishment of actual t i t l e  
to the land required a complicated series of steps involving the loca­
tion and survey of a t rac t  and the f i l i n g  of papers with the Virg in ia  
land o f f ice  in Richmond. Because Virg inia had granted more land than 
was avai lable ,  and because surveying techniques were pr im it ive ,  con­
f l i c t i n g  claims abounded. In such cases the only way to protect a 
claim was to f i l e  a caveat with the land of f ice  against a r iva l  claim
to the same parcel and await a court decision on the matter. Every
inch of Kentucky land was quickly disputed. John Marshall was in a
p ar t icu la r ly  advantageous position to p ro f i t  from this reservoir of
potential legal business. He had been an o f f ice r  in the Continental
Army, had leg is la t ive  connections, and resided in Richmond near the
land o f f ic e .  But the chief circumstance which placed Marshall in
position to build up a substantial real estate practice was his
connection with his fa ther .  Thomas Marshall had moved to Kentucky
where he was appointed surveyor for Fayette County, and soon became one
of the best-established surveyors in the entire  area. He quickly
formed a partnership with his lawyer son in Richmond. After John had
obtained the warrants, Thomas would survey the land. John would then
f i l e  the papers with the land o f f ice .  The two men were thus well
situated to obtain warrants and f i l e  caveats for m i l i ta ry  veterans and
others speculating in western lands with V irg in ia 's  depreciated 
77currency.
The records of John Marshall 's law practice are r i f e  with 
evidences of the close connection between father and son in real estate 
matters. As early as 1782 the son had placed a public notice in the 
Virg in ia  Gazette that the "Surveyor for  the County of Fayette" [Thomas
Marshall] had opened an of f ice  for  a l l  those who had lands to locate or
78survey. Later, John Marshall records paying, on behalf of his 
fa the r ,  the hefty sum of £100 to the College of William and Mary as the
statutory surveyor's fee of one-sixth of a l l  surveying fees col-
79lected. Indeed, during his f i r s t  years of practice the younger
Marshall collected fees on behalf of his father to ta l l in g  over 
80£235. There is also evidence of the role John Marshall played in
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relat ing to c lients in the father-son partnership. Late in 1784 John 
Marshall wrote to James Monroe, that "I shewd my Father that part of 
your l e t t e r ,  which respects the western Country. He says he w i l l  ren­
der you every service of the kind you mention which is within his power
81with a great deal of pleasure." More specific  is the service ren­
dered to Arthur Lee. In late 1782 Lee had asked Thomas Marshall to 
locate two tracts  of land in Kentucky amounting to some 10,000 acres. 
Subsequently, the elder Marshall not i f ied  Lee that he had not been able 
to f in ish  locating the land, and asked Lee to pay the deputy and 
reg is ter 's  fees. The money was to be delivered to John Marshall in 
Richmond. In February 1783 the lawyer son wrote Lee, notifying him
that he (Marshall) had detained "forty  f ive  pounds for the fees due on
82your western lands."
While John Marshall 's active part ic ipation in matters pertaining to
real estate is evident from the records, his precise actions on
cl ients '  behalf are somewhat more obscure. Marshall 's records reveal
54 cases in which i t  is possible to ident i fy  a specific legal a c t iv i ty
relat ing to real estate. Of these, 23 involved actions in ejectment,
8310 were actions to quiet t i t l e  to land, while 9 were caveats.
Marshall also engaged in the drafting of conveyances and the drawing of
deeds (5 instances each), and on one occasion provided "Advice on Wel- 
84bournes deed." In addition, he act ive ly  represented c l ients '
interests in ways that are not so easily labelled. For instance, Mar­
shall often acted as agent for his c l ients .  In early 1788, Charles 
Tyler appointed "my trusty fr iend John Marshall . . .  my true and
Lawful Attorney, for me and in my behalf to subscribe my name to an
85Assignment of a certain Tract or parcel of Land . . . "  S im i lar ly ,
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86Marshall sometimes advanced fees to be paid a surveyor, or
otherwise advanced necessary monies: "Pd. for Mr. Colston in a tax on
87deed from Peachy to him, £7-10." Of course, he also engaged in
l i t ig a t io n  in support of his c l ien ts '  rea l ty  in terests .  For example,
in June 1787 he recorded a fee "From Mr. Bryan for  a suit  with Withers
88concerning land in Fauqr." Undoubtedly the most notable cause in
th is respect was the landmark case of Hite y_. F a i r fa x , in which
Marshall argued before the Court of Appeals on behalf of the property
interests of the heirs of Lord Fairfax.  A related case eventually
brought John Marshall before the United States Supreme Court and helped
89to establish his national reputation.
Land causes, then, made up an important part of John Marshall 's
90early legal practice. I t  appears that a s ign if icant  role was also 
played by Marshall 's representation of clients regarding matters per­
taining to w i l ls  and estates.
Wil ls  and Estate Practice
John Marshall was often called upon to assist his clients in
matters pertaining to the testamentary disposition of th e ir  property.
Commonly, Marshall would be asked to provide counsel concerning the
making of a w i l l .  His fee book abounds with such notations as "Advice
91fee on Hardaways w i l l . "  Of the iden t i f iab le  cases involving w i l l s ,
92nearly 40 percent involved th is sort of a c t iv i ty .  In at least one
instance, Marshall gave such aid to a th ird  person; he provided "Colo.
93[Wil liam] Peachy advice on the w i l l  of Mr. Samuel Peachy." Mar-
94sh a l l 's  duties often extended also to the interpretation of w i l ls .
For instance, in May 1784, the lawyer wrote to John Ambler: " . . .
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you request me to give you my opinion on your Fathers w i l l  with respect
to Masons claim on a part of the slaves. I have been reading the w i l l
& re a l ly  think i t  to in t r ic a te  to determine on the question without
mature consideration . . . .  At present I can only say that I am
rather inclined to think that his claim is not a good one though i t  is
a point on which I am by no means yet awhile decided." Marshall was
95eventually to charge Ambler £9-12 for his counsel. In addition,
Marshall was often involved in "establishing" a w i l l ,  and he records
96one fee "from Colo. Carrington for  probate of w i l l . "
The attempt to "establish" a w i l l  involved l i t ig a t io n .  Indeed, 
many disputes relat ing to w i l ls  found the ir  way to the courts. One of 
Marshall 's cases in part icu lar  serves to evoke the f lavor  of such a dis­
pute. The case of Ashton v^ . West demonstrates the complexity of some 
of these actions and suggests the degree of sophistication necessary to 
handle such l i t ig a t io n .  Ashton was a case arising from the in terpreta­
tion of a wi11, with the p l a i n t i f f  Ashton seeking a court order to 
eject the defendant West from a certain piece of land. Who held r ight  
to the land hinged on a w i l l  that had been executed nearly ninety years 
previously. On the surface, the words of the w i l l  seemed c lear ly  to 
favor the p l a i n t i f f ' s  case. But John Marshall, with fe llow counsel 
Charles Lee, argued that the testator  did not mean what he said in the 
w i l l .  A technical and sp ir i ted  legal argument ensued before the judges 
of the General Court, and the court eventually unanimously found for  
Marshall and his c l ie n t .  The court agreed that the defendant had 
successfully established three objections to the p l a i n t i f f ' s  claim 
(regarding the impact of the creation of "cross-remainders," the lack
of the necessary possession of the land, and the fa i lu r e  to come within
97the statute of l im i ta t ion s ) .
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While such l i t ig a t io n  demanded much of Marshall 's attention,  th is  
aspect of his practice was not l imited to work with w i l l s .  A s i g n i f i ­
cant portion of Marshall 's early years at the bar was spent either rep­
resenting the interests of executors and administrators of estates,  or 
in advocating positions in opposition to such an executor or adminis­
t ra to r .  In a l l ,  eighty-seven cases can be discerned where Marshall had 
some contact with the f iduc iary  of an estate. In over 60 percent of
the cases, Marshall represented the decedent's estate, while in the re-
98maining actions he found himself in opposition to such an in terest .
P ar t icu lar ly  as his practice matured in 1787 and 1788 th is sort of
c l ien t  became prominent. While in 1784 less than 1 percent of his
cases and income can be attr ibuted to the representation of estates,  by
1787 nearly 7 percent of Marshall 's income was so derived, and in 1788
over 10 percent involved the representation of an executor or adminis-
99t ra to r  of an estate.
Analysis of Marshall 's work with estates provides further insight 
into the nature of his early law practice. For example, in the in­
stances where he represented an estate, the large majority of cases 
(over 85 percent) came within the common law rather than e q u i t y . " ^  
Sim i lar ly ,  an overwhelming percentage of cases were orig inal in nature;
less than 10 percent of the estate cases Marshall handled were on 
101appeal. Moreover, although the information is scanty concerning 
the courts before which Marshall argued these estate actions, the 
evidence is nevertheless suggestive. Twelve of the th irteen cases so 
ident i f ied  were in the General Court (the remaining action Marshall 
argued before the High Court of Chancery). Perhaps more interest ing is 
the type of case in which Marshall was engaged. Exactly half  of the
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causes in such l i t ig a t io n  (15 of 30 iden t i f iab le  cases) entailed some 
form of debt action. Another four causes of action were in detinue, 
three involved a replevy bond, while two others sounded in trespass on 
the case. F in a l ly ,  of the twelve cases where the outcome is known, 
Marshall won seven, and lost f iv e .
While the above figures should be read with a good deal of caution 
(the information is too scanty to provide the basis for any solid 
conclusions), they do help il luminate this portion of Marshall 's prac­
t ic e .  Another logical grouping of cases which arises from the analysis 
of the records relates to his representation of commercial c l ien ts .
Commercial Practice
In his early years as a practicing attorney, John Marshall devoted
102himself to the representation of commercial c l ien ts .  For example, 
Marshall notes a rather large fee from "Mr. Heron"--a Richmond mer- 
a n t- - fo r  "law business." This was probably a fee in the nature of a re­
ta iner  obligating the young attorney to represent Heron's business in- 
103terests .  S im i lar ly ,  Marshall 's l is t in g  of a fee "From Pollard
for Biddle & Co" undoubtedly represents moneys received from the agent
104of a company (probably fore ign).  The location of the corporate
c l ien t  is clearer when Marshall l is ts  a receipt "From Mr. Gracie for
105Hazlegreen & Co. Merchts. of Amsterdam."
An idea of the nature of the duties John Marshall performed for his 
commercial clients can be gleaned from his records. In April 1786 
Marshall records a large fee "From McRoberts for  d i f f t  persons." 
McRoberts was a Richmond merchant; the cryptic notation "for d i f fe ren t  
persons" could well have referred to several collection matters handled
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106by the young attorney. More clear is the collection le t te r
written by the advocate to Cadwalader Jones: "Sir :  An order of yours
on Mr. Williams Constable Mercht. of Philadelphia for 2000 wt. of
tob[acc]o in favor of Mr. Gratz & which is returned unpaid has been in
my hands upwards of twelve months & Mr. Gratz is now anxious about pay- 
107ment." Another time Marshall represented the Philadelphia firm of
W il l ing ,  Morris & Co. in defending a suit seeking to se t t le  some commer-
. . .  . 1 0 8cial accounts.
Marshall was apparently also closely involved with legal matters
concerning b i l l s  of exchange. For instance, he l is ts  a fee from a suit
109"on a b i l l  exchange." An example of the type of action that might
arise from such b i l l s  is that of Wilson _v. Powel 1. In that case, John
Marshall represented the p l a i n t i f f ,  an assignee of Jesse Simms. John
Harper, "a person in trade and commerce and being indebted to the said
Jesse Simms," drew an order upon a third person [the eventual defendant
Robert Powell], ordering Powell to "Please pay Mr. Jesse Simms one
hundred twelve Dollars which is the sum you are owing me." Powell
thereupon "accepted the Order according to the customs of Merchants in
such cases." When Powell la ter  refused to pay Simms the money, an
"action accrued to the said Jesse Simms to demand and have [the 
110money]." Marshall also u t i l i z e d  b i l l s  of exchange in his own
behalf. In December of 1785 Marshall recorded a disbursement "by a
b i l l  in favor of Messieurs Williams & Rochester & Co" to ta l l in g  over 
111eighty pounds.
Further insight into John Marshall 's commercial l i t ig a t io n  practice 
can be derived from his records. Again, while the sample is small 
( approximately 30 cases), analysis of its tendencies is revealing. In
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these cases, Marshall represented a commercial c l ien t  nearly 40 percent
of the time, and found himself in opposition to commercial interests  
112the remainder. The great majority of his cases (87 percent) were
113within the ju r isd ic t ion  of the common-law rather than chancery.
S im i lar ly ,  John Marshall 's commercial practice appears to have been
114overwhelmingly of an "original"  (as opposed to appellate) nature.
Predictably, his l i t ig a t io n  in th is  f i e ld  was ch ief ly  before the 
115General Court. In commercial actions, the young advocate
represented the p l a i n t i f f  40 percent of the time, the defendant 60 
percent. The types of cases with which Marshall became involved are of 
in terest .  Of the thirteen cases where th is is ascertainable, eight 
related to "debt" causes, while four were in trespass on the case 
(according to Marshall 's own categorization; in r e a l i t y  actions in 
"debt" and "case" were often interchangeable). Of the debt cases, 
three were based on bonds, three on b i l l s  of exchange, and one sounded 
in indebitatus assumpsit on a promissory note. F ina l ly ,  in the few 
cases (twelve) where the result  is known, John Marshall won h a l f ,  and 
lost half .
Another topical area of the young lawyer's legal practice, while of 
a somewhat less important nature, was Marshall 's involvement in 
criminal cases.
Criminal Practice
Until 1786 Marshall occasionally represented a c l ient  in a criminal
proceeding; a f ter  that date, evidence of this sort of legal a c t iv i ty
disappears. During his f i r s t  eight years of practice, less than 1
116percent of the young lawyer's cases were of a criminal nature.
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But the cases he did involve himself in were of a highly varied 
nature. In October 1785 Marshall received a fee "From 
Peachums—Murder." That same month the advocate noted that he repre­
sented Burton "for horse steal ing." At least two defendants were 
charged with robbery, while a Mr. Coats was prosecuted for "passing [a ]  
forged no te ."^^
A f in a l  aspect of John Marshall 's early legal practice was his 
provision of legal opinions and advice. While not as top ica l ly  well 
defined as some of the e a r l ie r  analysis, this nevertheless formed an 
important part of his professional l i f e .
Legal Opinions and Advice
Without question one of the most frequently occurring notations in 
John Marshall 's account book is that for "advice." The eighty-eight  
entries thus recorded represent 8 percent of his tota l fees for the 
period. Moreover, the percentage of his fees at tr ibutable  to "advice" 
rises steadily and dramatically during his f i r s t  years of practice. In 
1784 and 1785, a l i t t l e  over 4 percent of Marshall 's cases involved pro­
viding counsel. By 1786-1787, this had increased to nearly 10
percent. In 1788 almost 13 percent of the young lawyer's recorded
118a c t iv i t ie s  pertained to counselling his c l ie n te le .  This steady 
increase comports with a perception of Marshall 's growing status in the 
community as a legal advisor.
Marshall did not often describe the subject matter of his counsel; 
in those cases where the topic is discernible , i t — predictably— varied.  
We have seen an example of the young counsellor's advice concerning 
matters testamentary when he wrote John Ambler regarding his fa ther 's
29.
119w i l l .  Another time Marshall provided advice to "Mr. 1ukes on
120contract to lease a tavern to Mr. Hawkins." Sometimes the advo­
cate's input amounted to l i t t l e  more than a situation report. In 
February of 1787 he reported to c l ien t  John Alexander on the status of 
his su it .  "The Judges seem rather to incl ine to continue the injunc­
tion u n t i l l  the f in a l  hearing of the suit & to decide on the whole to-  
121gether." At other times, Marshall appeared to gently suggest a
course of action. He wrote Leven Powell concerning his l i t ig a t io n
with "Burwells Exrs": " I f  the matter is not arb itra ted ,  [ i t ]  w i l l
122without question be tr ied  next Court."
Perhaps most revealing is the counsel Marshall sometimes gave to
other members of the legal profession. Younger members of the bar in
part icular  seemed to be the benef iciaries of the Marshall wisdom. In
September of 1786, he responded to a request for assistance from
William Branch Giles: "I  think on looking at the law the gaming act
[stat ing that gaming debts were unenforceable at law] ought to be
123pleaded and cannot be given in evidence on the plea of payment."
In another case Marshall agreed with Giles that the l a t t e r 's  c l ien t  had
the basis for a successful appeal, although he chastized the attorney
below for fa i l in g  to demur: "Doubtless the orig inal ins t i tu t ion  of the
suit was wrong and there can be no question but that the error would
have been deemed fa ta l  on demurrer. The only question is whether i t  is
124cured by verd ict ,  I think now i t  is not . . . "  S im i lar ly ,
Marshall took great pains to assist neophyte lawyer John Breckinridge. 
He responded to a Breckinridge request: " I  shall with very much
pleasure make you any communications on legal or any other subjects 
whenever you chuse. I cannot promise you that they w i l l  be worth
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receiving, but such as they are--take them." Marshall proceeded to de­
scribe in great detail  the procedure for obtaining a writ  of habeas
125corpus, and concludes "I wish you great success at the bar." A 
few months la ter  Breckinridge turned to Marshall again, seeking confirm­
ation that one of his cl ients had a basis for appeal. Marshall had to 
disappoint him. "I  have looked i t  over but do not think there is any 
error in i t .  Will  you please mention what mistake the clerk has
committed? I see some thing not en t i re ly  usual but I think there is
126nothing materia l."  Such reliance on Marshall 's knowledge of the 
law suggests that by 1787 his standing at the bar was high. This con­
ception of Marshall 's emerging reputation is reinforced by yet another
scrap of evidence. In February 1787, Marshall recorded a fee "From
127Southampton Justices for advice." Apparently even some of the 
jud ic ia ry  were turning to the up-and-coming lawyer for counsel.
On occasion, Marshall gave advice of a more formal nature. For 
instance, he was named as an arb it ra tor  in a dispute where Philadelphia 
merchant Simon Nathan claimed he had accepted thirteen b i l l s  of ex­
change from General George Rogers Clark for m i l i ta ry  supplies and was
due the face amount in specie rather than depreciated currency. Mar-
128shall agreed with Nathan that the b i l l s  were drawn for specie. On 
another occasion the governor requested John Marshall 's services regard­
ing a t r icky  criminal question. James Goss had been convicted of horse 
stealing and was sentenced to death. He escaped from j a i l ,  but was 
apprehended. The governor pardoned him on condition of three years' 
hard labor. Goss escaped again. When he was again in custody, the 
governor revoked the pardon and sentenced him to die. Apparently an 
appeal was made to the governor and Council to reconsider Goss's
31.
conviction on the ground he was insane. Marshall was appointed to a
panel of three to give an opinion on the defendant's sanity. I t  was
the opinion of the panel that "tho the unhappy object [Goss] is
ignorant & Stupid to a great degree, yet we are perfect ly  convinced he
does not come under the Term of Idiotism or insanity, but is a
129Competent Judge of Right from Wrong." And, in 1787, the
attorney-general called upon the young lawyer to give counsel on
130several questions relat ing to the Naval Off ice in V irg in ia .
Again, th is seeking of Marshall 's legal opinion by the most prominent 
cit izens of the Commonwealth demonstrates his rising legal reputation.
While the general nature of John Marshall 's early law practice can 
be described and analyzed under convenient topical headings, another 
major aspect of his practice is not so neatly defined. A great part of 
his professional a c t iv i t ie s  related to disputes in actual l i t ig a t io n .
No survey of Marshall 's practice would be complete without looking to 
the nature of his courtroom a c t iv i ty .
CHAPTER THREE 
TRIAL PRACTICE
John Marshall was f i r s t  and foremost a t r i a l  lawyer. In his i n i t i a l
eight years of practice there is evidence of the young lawyer l i t ig a t in g
over seven hundred cases; two-thirds of a l l  his recorded legal a c t iv i t ie s
131related to matters at issue before the courts of V irg in ia .  The sur­
viving evidence of this key aspect of Marshall 's early law practice is 
sporadic and uneven in qual i ty .  Nevertheless, this documentation of his 
early professional l i f e  gives us some idea of the nature of cases in which 
the young lawyer involved himself, and provides a glimpse of the hurly- 
burly of t r i a l  practice before the superior courts of V irg in ia  in the late  
eighteenth century.
Side Represented
Inevitably ,  John Marshall brought his legal expertise to bear for  
clients situated on one side of a controversy or the other. In original  
actions (which we have seen constituted over 80 percent of his t r i a l  prac­
t i c e ) ,  Marshall did not special ize in representing either  p l a in t i f f s  or de­
fendants. In fa c t ,  the records reveal that he went before the bar of the 
court a remarkably equal number of times for each. During Marshall 's  
f i r s t  eight years of practice, he represented p l a in t i f f s  in 284 cases 
(49.7 percent of the time) and defendants in 287 cases (50.3 percent).
32.
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When viewing the side represented measured as a percentage of his income,
the results are dramatically the same. In those eight years Marshall
earned £867 representing p l a in t i f f s  and £877 on behalf of 
132defendants. While Marshall 's practice before appellate courts was
much smaller, his representation of c l ients '  interests on appeal reveals a
similar  even d is tr ibu t ion .  Marshall represented the appellant (the person
133appealing) 54 percent of the time, and the appellee 46 percent.
Although the available figures are much less re l ia b le ,  i t  is possible 
to look at the varying emphases of Marshall 's practice through the lens of 
the side he represented in l i t i g a t i o n .  In his real estate practice, Mar­
shall represented the p l a i n t i f f  56 percent of the time, and the defendant 
13444 percent. In Marshall 's commercial practice, this trend was re­
versed; he represented the defendant more often (60 percent of the time)
135than the p l a i n t i f f .  S im i lar ly ,  in the representation of decedent's
estates, the young advocate appeared on behalf of the defendant in the
. .. ,  136majority of cases.
There was also much variety in the nature of the cases which Marshall
l i t ig a te d .  The young lawyer immersed himself in l i t ig a t io n  involving a
wide assortment of causes of action.
Causes of Action
While Marshall 's l i t ig a t io n  practice incorporated diverse causes of 
action, the types of cases he engaged in before the courts of V irg in ia  can 
in large part be grouped into general categories which assist in under­
standing this portion of his professional duties.
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The largest of such groupings— amounting to over one-third of Mar­
sha l l 's  t r i a l  practice—were those causes of action based upon a concep­
tion of one party “owing" another person: actions in debt or assumpsit,
or related actions such as detinue or replevin , or— occasionally— causes
137sounding in trespass on the case. Of these, “debt" actions were the
most numerous, to ta l l in g  over 20 percent of John Marshall 's l i t ig a t io n  
138practice. In general, "debt" was the name of a common law action
139appropriate to recover a specif ic sum of money. But within the gen­
eral category of debt lay cases of greatly  d i f fer ing  characterist ics.
Some debt actions in Marshall 's practice arose out of unforeseen situa­
tions. In the case of Johnston v. W ia t t , the defendant Wiatt had arranged 
to make a t r ip  overland. Johnston, the p l a i n t i f f ,  requested that Wiatt 
purchase some goods on Johnson's behalf,  and had given the defendant money 
with which to do so. Unluckily, during the course of his travels Wiatt 's
horse spooked and ran o f f ,  with the accompanying loss of the saddlebags
140containing the p l a i n t i f f ' s  money. An action of debt ensued. Far
more common were actions of debt based on written documents. Marshall 's
papers reveal a few cases of debt grounded on b i l l s  of exchange, but the
overwhelming majority of these sorts of cases were debt suits connected to
141a bond executed by the defendant. The function of the simple bond 
was to secure the payment of the debt. For example, i f  one party lent 
money to another, he would require the borrower to execute a bond. The 
form of the bond generally obligated the borrower to pay the lender a 
large fixed sum i f  the condition contained within the bond was not 
sat is f ied (that  is ,  unless the orig inal debt were repaid within a 
specified length of time.)  I f  the debtor did not meet his obligation, the 
lender could bring suit  on the penal amount in the bond. Because the
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borrower had signed and sealed the bond, he was precluded from denying i ts
operation. His only recourse was to plead satisfact ion of the condition
[tha t  he had repaid the debt]; this was the typical issue before the 
142jury .  The transactions underlying such bonds were various. While at
times i t  was a mere monetary loan, at other times i t  was more complex. In
1784 Marshall recorded a fee "Reed, from Mr. Perfect to bring suit against
143Page's Exrs. on a bond to convey etc."  More specific was the
language of the bond underlying the debt action in the case of Smith v^ .
Lowry. There the transaction was "one Wagon & Team consisting of four
horses in Hand Delivered to the said John Lowry by the said John Smith For
which the said John Lowry . . .  is to give and Deliver unto the said Jn
Smith . . . two male Negroes Between the age of Sixteen and Twenty f ive
years which negroes are to be healthy Sound & Sound in Mind and Well Grown
144and under a Good Character."
Sometimes an action in debt was inappropriate for a case involving
"owing;" for example, when the promise to pay had to be implied by law
from the situation or the relat ionship between the part ies.  In such
145cases, the cause of action often used was labelled "assumpsit." Mar­
sha l l 's  practice included occasional cases of th is nature ( approximately 7
146percent of the "owing" cases). In Braxton v. Beal 1 , for instance,
the lower court judgment had been based on a plea of indebitatus
assumpsit, the facts alleging that the defendant was indebted to the
p l a i n t i f f  in the amount of £6000, for goods sold and delivered, at the
147defendant's request, to a th ird  party.
Another form of action arising in Marshall 's practice which can be 
categorized under the general rubric of "owing" cases was that of 
"detinue." Detinue was the cause of action appropriate for the recovery
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of personal chattels (together with damages) from one who had acquired pos-
148session of them lawfully  but retained them without r igh t .  About 16
149percent of the "owing" cases in Marshall 's practice were in detinue.
Most of these cases where the chattel was ident i f iab le  involved "Detinue
for Slaves." In at least one case, however, the action was for a mare
150valued at th i r t y  pounds. A similar cause of action that appeared in
Marshall 's law practice was "replevin."  Replevin was the form of action
151brought to recover the possession of goods unlawfully taken. Appar­
en t ly ,  the actions of replevin and detinue were nearly interchangeable in 
eighteenth-century V irg in ia .  In one of Marshall 's cases the p l a i n t i f f
f i r s t  sued in the county court in replevin; fa i l in g  there, he f i l e d  a suit
152in detinue in the General Court. Sometimes Marshall 's a c t iv i t ie s
involved what were called "replevin bonds." A replevin bond was normally
executed to protect the o f f ic e r  who served a writ  of replevin [ in  a l l
p robabi l i ty  the s h e r i f f ] ,  as well as to indemnify the defendant i f  his
153property were wrongfully taken.
The action of "trespass on the case," or, more commonly, simply
"case," was the form of action adapted to the recovery of damages arising
from the wrongful act of another, and was often used when the other forms
154of action would not l i e .  In practice, an action in "case" was often
interchangeable with that of assumpsit. John Marshall 's annotations in
such actions did not often c la r i f y  when this form of action was being
u t i l i z e d  for "owing" cases as opposed to other sorts of wrongs. But i t  is
clear that at least on occasion Marshall 's t r i a l  practice included actions
of trespass on the case in owing situations. In Tomlin v. K e l ly , for
155instance, an action in "case" appeared "for goods sold & delivered."
Often, "case" would be the chosen form of proceeding in actions that
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appeared to be more contractual in nature. John Marshall argued th is very
point in the case of Muir & Wiatt v. Martin Key. This was an orig inal
action in the General Court, sounding in case. The controversy was based
on a contract under seal,  the p l a i n t i f f  alleging that the defendant had
fa i led  to del iver tobacco. Marshall for  the defendant argued that the
wrong cause of action had been u t i l i z e d ,  asserting that an action on the
case would not l i e  when there was a contract under seal. The judges,
156however, allowed the case to go to the ju ry .  Nor was this the only
such instance of a blurring of the causes of action. In another action
two causes between the same parties were heard on the same day. The f i r s t
form of action was in debt and was dismissed. The second sounded in case,
alleging damages for the wrongful breach of the contract, and was
157permitted to go to the jury .
Although "owing" cases accounted for the larger portion of John Mar­
sh a l l 's  l i t i g a t i o n ,  a second s ignif icant  category of his t r i a l  practice re­
lated to "land causes" such as actions in ejectment, suits to quiet t i t l e ,
caveats and other land-related controversies. In a l l ,  such land-based
158actions made up nearly 18 percent of Marshall 's l i t ig a t io n  practice.
The most common form of proceeding in this area was a suit in ejectment.
Over 50 percent of the land-related causes of Marshall 's t r i a l  practice
159were of this nature. At common law, "ejectment" was the name of an
action which lay for the recovery of the possession of land, and for
160damages for i ts  unlawful detention. One of the few ejectment actions 
where the factual deta i ls  s t i l l  survive is the case of Payne v. George. 
There the p l a i n t i f f  claimed "in ejectment for two Plantations . . . two 
Gardens and four hundred and f i f t y  acres of Land with the appurtenances."
A jury  t r i a l  found for the p l a i n t i f f ,  and granted one penny damages. The
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court then granted the land and damages to the p l a i n t i f f  (but gave the de-
161fendant eight months to vacate the premises). A second cause r e l a t ­
ing to land which was common in John Marshall 's t r i a l  practice was that of
an action to "quiet t i t l e "  (amounting to over 20 percent of the land-
162related controversies). This was a proceeding to establish the p la in ­
t i f f ' s  t i t l e  to land by bringing into court an adverse claimant and there
compelling him either to establish his claim or be forever af ter  barred
163from asserting i t .  Marshall 's experience with actions to quiet t i t l e
in his early years at the bar came ch ie f ly  in the aftermath of the Hite v_.
Fairfax decision. I t  w i l l  be recalled that Marshall had appeared in that
major case adjudicating the t i t l e  to lands in V irg in ia 's  Northern Neck.
The decree in that l i t ig a t io n  had been f ina l  as regards Lord Fa ir fax,  but
the court had l e f t  the door ajar for further  l i t ig a t io n  between the Hite
interests and a l l  others holding land in the disputed area. Indeed the
Court of Appeals invited such a c t iv i ty  when its  decree permitted such
parties to submit th e ir  petit ions for equitable r e l i e f  within three months 
164of the decision. John Marshall thereafter  f i l e d  b i l l s  seeking to 
quiet t i t l e  for  at least ten occupants of the Northern Neck. Yet another 
form of action involving land has been discussed previously. Marshall 
spent nearly 20 percent of his time l i t ig a t in g  land causes in the form of 
caveats — a kind of equitable process designed to stay the granting of a 
patent for  l a n d . ^
A th ird overarching category of causes in John Marshall 's t r i a l  prac­
t ice  could be labelled "personal" causes; that is ,  those actions which in­
volved some form of harm to the individual: assault and battery, slander,
or trespass on the case. This category would also include causes requir­
ing writs of habeas corpus. In a l l ,  these "personal" causes accounted for
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another 20 percent of Marshall 's l i t ig a t io n  practice.
Cases involving the most immediate threat to individuals were actions
of assault and battery. Marshall recorded his a c t iv i t y  in many such
cases; indeed, 40 percent of the "personal" causes he labelled as actions
in "Trespass, Assault and Battery." That annotation described causes
t r a d i t io n a l ly  referred to as "trespass vi et armis" (trespass with force
and arms)--an old common law action which lay for the recovery of damages
for any in jury caused by the defendant's use of d irect force against the
167p l a i n t i f f  or his property. Marshall 's declaration on behalf of one
of his clients c lear ly  demonstrates a typical factual s ituat ion: "Edward
Robertson complains of William Hobson [and others] . . . that . . . with
force and Arms v iz .  with Sticks, F is ts ,  Clubs Knives and Swords in and
upon the said P l a i n t i f f  . . .  an assault did make thrice did then and
there beat, wound, bruise maime and cru l ly  entreat so that his l i f e  i t  was
greatly despaired and then other enormityes to and upon him to his damage
f i f tee n  hundred pounds & he therefore sues."
A cause involving less of a physical threat to the individual but one
nonetheless damaging to him was that of trespass on the case. This cause
lay for the recovery of damages for some in jury resulting to a party from
the wrongful act of another, unaccompanied by direct force. Another 30
percent of John Marshall 's "personal" causes of action sounded in 
169"case." A more specif ic  example of a personal cause was that of 
slander. Simply put, this action involved the speaking of fa lse and 
malicious words about another. Marshall 's endeavors in th is area (which 
amounted to somewhat over 10 percent of his "personal" causes) can be 
demonstrated by the answer f i l e d  in the case of Kel1 urn _v. West, where the 
defendant "says that he is not gu i l ty  of speaking those feigned,
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170scandalous and approbrious words." F ina l ly ,  personal causes would 
include those actions labelled "habeas corpus" which refer  to the fam il ia r  
writ  that commanded deliverance from legal confinement. Marshall recorded 
several instances of cases of "habeas corpus;" unfortunately, there were 
also several other forms of habeas corpus writs which related to such 
lesser a c t iv i t ie s  as removing a cause from one court to another. I t  is 
impossible to ascertain in which sorts of "habeas corpus" cases Marshall
 ^ 171engaged.
The grouping of causes of action under the general heads of "owing
causes," "land causes" and "personal causes" accounts for over 70 percent
172of the l i t ig a t io n  practice of John Marshall. The remainder of his 
t r i a l  practice consisted of more isolated types of cases, such as ones in 
admiralty or usury. But regardless of which cause of action a case 
sounded in , the l i t ig a t io n  could not be in i t ia ted  without some method of 
"pleading" to isolate the relevant issues involved.
Pleading
Suits at common law were begun by a process known as "pleading." In 
th is  process the parties to an action a l ternate ly  presented writ ten s tate­
ments of th e i r  contentions, with the ultimate goal being to narrow the 
f i e ld  of controversy until  there remained a single point, affirmed on one
side and denied on the other (called the "issue") upon which the parties
173proceeded to t r i a l .  John Marshall captured the essence of pleading
in his argument in the case of Pickett v. Claiborne: "All pleading is
founded in reason, and the object is to promote, not to prevent, the
174attainment of ju s t ic e ."
In simplif ied form, a common law action was begun by the p l a i n t i f f  
when he f i l e d  his "declaration," a formal and methodical specification of
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the facts and circumstances constituting his cause of action ( i t s  counter-
175part in equity was called a " b i l l " ) .  The formalized nature of the
declaration is demonstrated by Marshall 's purchase of sheafs of preprinted
declarations in which only the blanks needed to be f i l l e d  in with specif ic
176information relat ing to each case. Above a l l  else, the declaration
had to be specif ic .  In Straughan v. Lamkin, Marshall represented on 
appeal the p l a i n t i f f  below who had won a judgment. The higher court re­
versed the decision, stating that "the suit  was brought by summons and 
peti t ion for uncertain damages pretended to be sustained by reason of a 
suffered breach of c o n t r a c t . S i m i l a r l y  in Byrd v. Hoi combe the 
p l a i n t i f f  had drafted a declaration in debt on a bond, but had not spelled 
out the penal provisions of the bond. John Marshall for the defendant
argued that this was improper; the court agreed, and nonsuited the
, . . 178p l a i n t i f f .
The p l a i n t i f f ' s  declaration was normally followed by the defendant's
"answer." This was the pleading by which the defendant endeavored to
resis t  the p l a i n t i f f  by e ither  denying the allegations of the declaration
or by confessing them and alleging new matter which the defendant believed
179would prevent recovery. Of course, the defendant's defense depended
upon what the p l a i n t i f f  had alleged in the declaration. In the early
years of John Marshall 's practice there are r e la t iv e ly  few cases in which
records have survived providing information as to the matters pleaded as a
defense. While the small sample makes any conclusion speculative, i t  is
clear that the normal practice was to plead the "general issue," that is ,
to plead a general denial of the p l a i n t i f f ' s  al legations. This preserved
180a l l  of the defendant's options. In Marshall 's practice, the defen­
dant pleaded one form or another of general denial ( i t s  t i t l e  depended
42.
upon what cause of action the p l a i n t i f f  had brought) in over 50 percent of
181the id en t i f iab le  cases. In some instances (about 30 percent of the
t o t a l ) ,  the plea in defense was of "conditions performed" or "pay- 
182ment," while in a few cases the response to the p l a i n t i f f  alleged
that e ither  insuf f ic ien t  information had been provided with which to form
183a rebu tta l ,  or that the p l a i n t i f f  had followed improper procedures.
In reviewing the pleading process i t  is interesting to note the high 
percentage of cases in John Marshall 's practice that actually resulted in 
the joinder of issue. Over 90 percent of his cases survived beyond the 
pleading stage. Less than 10 percent of the defendants confessed judg­
ment, and there is l i t t l e  evidence of cases going to p l a in t i f f s  on default  
184judgments. Once the issue was joined, there was further  a c t iv i ty  
prior to the actual t r i a l .
Pre-Tr ia l  A c t iv i t ie s
Evidence survives for at least some of John Marshall 's legal i n i t i a ­
tives prior to the commencement of t r i a l ,  and serve to il luminate the 
nature of p r e - t r i a l  proceedings. One of the f i r s t  and most fundamental 
tasks of the t r i a l  lawyer was to ensure that the opposing party appeared 
on the appointed day in court. This was generally accomplished by a pro­
cedure en t i t led  "b a i l . "  In c iv i l  actions, bail was the proceeding whereby 
certain th ird  persons undertook to guarantee the attendance of the defen­
dant. Normally these th ird  persons, or "sureties,"  would execute a "bail  
bond," binding themselves to secure the defendant's appearance. I f  he
should f a i l  to appear, the bond provided that the sureties would pay the
185amount which the p l a i n t i f f  stood to recover. An example of the pro­
cess of "standing bail"  can be found in the court papers surrounding one
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of Marshall 's cases, Hindman & Co. _v. Bal 1. The bail bond stated "the
said Burges Ball [the defendant] w i l l  pay and sa t is fy  the Condemnation of
the Court or render his body to prison in Execution for the same, or that
the said William McWilliams [the surety] w i l l  do i t  for  him." Another
case demonstrates how complicated this procedure could become. Chrisman
v_. Trents was a suit against the surety, who had allegedly agreed to stand
bail for  the defendant in the orig inal action. The sh er i f f  had permitted
the orig inal defendant to depart, and the surety had refused to stand bail
in his stead. In the lower court, the p l a i n t i f f  had won an action against
the surety. On appeal, John Marshall represented the surety and argued
that the p l a i n t i f f ' s  cause of action in r e a l i t y  should have been directed
toward the sh er i f f  for  wrongfully releasing the defendant. The court
186agreed with Marshall and reversed the judgment.
Another method of securing the attendance of the defendant was by writ
of attachment. The purpose was to take the defendant's property into
legal custody, so that i t  might be applied on the defendant's debt to the
p l a i n t i f f  once i t  was established. I f  the defendant fa i le d  to appear in
court, he would f o r f e i t  this security. Thus in Haskins v_. Ellyson the
s h er i f f  was "hereby commanded [ to ]  attach so much of the Goods and
Chattels of the [defendant] as w i l l  be su f f ic ien t  to sa t is fy  and pay [the
187amount claimed by the p l a i n t i f f ] . "
Sometimes Marshall as attorney for  the p l a i n t i f f  f e l t  that his 
c l ie n t 's  cause could not afford to wait for the matter to be decided at 
t r i a l .  In such instances, he would apply in equity for  an injunction,  
seeking an order restra ining the defendant from continuing the a c t iv i ty  
which was injurious to his c l ie n t .  In West v. King, Marshall represented 
a p l a i n t i f f  in a dispute over land. To prohibit  the defendant from
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sell ing the disputed parcel, Marshall prayed an injunction. Chancellor 
Wythe noted: "Let an injunction issue the Complainant giving bonds in the
penalty of eighty pounds with such security as i f  excepted to ,  may be 
proved s u f f ic ie n t .
One option frequently followed was the settlement of l i t ig a t io n  out of 
court. In the case of Monroe v. Johnston, the p l a i n t i f f  alleged that £400 
was owed him. Marshall,  for the defendant, offered to confess judgment to 
a somewhat lesser sum, on the condition that the p l a i n t i f f  grant his c l i ­
ent twenty days in which to prove further discounts in the amount owed.
The p l a i n t i f f  agreed and the matter was thus sett led.  Sometimes such set­
tlements would be enforced by a bond. In Brickhouse _v. Brick house, the 
part ies executed a bond to ensure the payment of the agreed-upon s e t t le ­
ment. Under the terms of the bond, "whereas there is a lawsuit depending 
. . . between [the part ies]  and [the defendant] has undertaken to compro­
mise and make up the said s u i t ,"  i f  the defendant paid the agreed-upon
amount by a certain date, the bond would be void. Otherwise the penal
189amount of the bond would be assessed against him.
When a lawyer represented the defendant, the appropriate action often
was to seek the dismissal of the suit  e n t i re ly .  Sometimes he secured th is
through negotiation with the opposition, and the case would be dismissed
"by the consent of the part ies ."  At other times he would rely  on the
court. W i l l is  \j_. White serves as an example. The court ordered that
"These suits are dismissed the P l t f .  not further  prosecuting . . . the
190Deft . . . recover against the said P l t f .  the ir  costs." In Lewis v. 
Richardson, the court went even fu r ther .  The court allowed "for [p la in ­
t i f f ' s ]  fa lse clamour . . . the Defendant . . .  to recover against the
191P i t .  One hundred and f i f t y  pounds of Tobacco for his nonsuit . . ."
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I t  was at th is stage also that motions could be f i l e d  before the court.
For example, in one case an appeal had been dismissed by the superior
court. The next day, "On the motion of the Appellants by the ir  Attorney,
and for reasons appearing to the Court, I t  is ordered that th is Appeal be
192reinstated on the Docket." As w i l l  be seen, this was also the
appropriate time for a motion for  a continuance.
Another p r e - t r ia l  a c t iv i ty  that engaged an attorney's attention and
which sought to avoid the time and expense of t r i a l  was the a l ternat ive  of
a rb i t ra t io n .  In such instances the opposing sides would agree on the
procedure to be followed: "The parties mutually submit a l l  matters in
difference between them re la t ive  to th is suit to the f ina l  determination
of [three appointed a rb i t ra to rs ] ,  whose award, or the award of any two of
193them, is to be made the Judgment of the Court."
Occasionally the time before t r i a l  was u t i l ize d  to secure the t e s t i ­
mony of key witnesses who might be unavailable at the actual t r i a l .
Typical was the case of Cotteral _v. Jordan, in which the defendant sought 
leave to take a deposition de bene esse of "an aged and infirm witness."
The court granted the request, provided proper notice was given to the 
194p l a i n t i f f .
Last but not least, many of an attorney's endeavors in the time before 
t r i a l  were directed toward seeking more time before t r i a l .  Continuances 
were a fact of l i f e  in eighteenth-century l i t ig a t io n .  Such delays in l i t i ­
gation could be at the behest of e ither  party. In Goodloe _v. Brock, "on 
the motion of the defts. by th e ir  attornies these suits are continued 
until  April  Court next at the Costs of the Defendants." When the case
came up the next year, both sides sought delay: "by consent of the par-
195ties th is suit  is continued t i l l  April Court next." Rela t ive ly  few
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court records of Marshall 's cases survive to permit analysis of delay in
l i t i g a t i o n .  Those that do are revealing. In those cases where continu-
196ances can be discerned, half  were continued f ive  or more times. Of
course th is meant that i t  took a s ignif icant amount of time to complete an
action. Looking to the length of time i t  took to conduct a lawsuit in
Marshall 's early  practice (from the f i l i n g  of the declaration to f ina l
197adjudication),  one finds an average span of four and one-half years.
Marshall— perhaps unwittingly--made a f i t t i n g  commentary on the impact of
lawyers in a le t te r  to one of his c l ients:  “The defendants have employed
a lawyer to keep o f f  judgement so that i t  w i l l  be a considerable time
198before judgements can be obtained."
Eventually, most cases came to actual t r i a l ,  whereupon John Marshall 
and his fellow members of the bar endeavored to t ry  the issue that had 
been formulated at the pleading stage.
Before the Bar
The nature of court reporting in the early years of John Marshall 's 
legal practice places severe constraints on analysis of courtroom ac­
t i v i t y .  Few descriptions of actual t r i a l s  ex is t ,  and those that do focus 
upon the legal arguments put forward by the lawyers rather than on the 
more mundane aspects of l i t ig a t io n .  This is pa r t icu la r ly  true of Mar­
s h a l l 's  practice during this period. Most of his cases were before the 
bar of the General Court. Our knowledge of his a c t iv i ty  there derives 
ch ie f ly  from the reports of one astute observer who was predominantly
interested in detai l ing the twists and turns of the law (St. George 
199Tucker). Nevertheless the existing documentation does provide some 
glimpse of Marshall in action in the courtroom.
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Before turning to Marshall 's presentation of his c l ients '  cases, i t  
should be noted that he did not always work alone. In many cases Marshall 
worked in close collaboration with other attorneys. In those cases where 
such information is discernible , Marshall was the sole counsel nearly 90 
percent of the time. But th is figure is s l ig h t ly  misleading. When the 
case was an orig inal cause of action, he indeed was highly l ik e ly  to work 
alone. However, when cases were on appeal, John Marshall acted as a 
co-counsel nearly 40 percent of the t im e .^ ^  For example, in Bates _v. 
Fuguay, a case on appeal to the General Court, Marshall worked closely 
with co-counsel John Taylor. In the ir  presentation, Marshall was respons­
ible for  arguing a procedural issue concerning the v a l id i t y  of a s t ipu la ­
tion agreed to in the court below, while his co-counsel addressed the sub-
201stantive issue of the entailment of slaves. The lawyers with whom
Marshall collaborated represented some of the greatest names of the
V irg in ia  bar: Charles Lee, Edmund Randolph, Jerman Baker, John Taylor,
and Paul Carrington, to name a few. Even when Marshall represented his
c l ien ts '  interests without assistance in the courtroom, he often worked
closely with other attorneys. When cases were on appeal, the cause in the
lower court had generally been handled by a lawyer practising at the
county court leve l .  The records reveal that Marshall received cases from
such lesser l ights as G r i f f in  St i th  of the Northampton County Court and
202Gabriel Jones in Staunton. In at least one instance, Marshall took
over the existing practice of a prominent attorney. When Edmund Randolph
was elected governor of V irg in ia  in 1786, he ran a notice in the Richmond
newspaper stating that because being governor was incompatible with
practising law, " I  beg leave to inform my clients that John Marshall,
203Esq., w i l l  succeed to my business in general." And i t  also worked in
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the other d irection.  Marshall transferred more than one-third of the
cases which he had begun in his f i r s t  eight years of practise to other
lawyers (c h ie f ly  because he chose not to practice in most d i s t r ic t  courts
204af ter  the 1788 reorganization). Predictably,  many of the recipients 
of this largess were fa m i l ia r .  When the case of Stringer v. Burton1s 
exrs. was transferred from the General Court to the Accomack D is t r ic t
Court, the lawyer Marshall chose to handle the l i t ig a t io n  was G r i f f in
c . ... 205 S t i th .
Whether acting as sole counsel or joining with other attorneys on be­
half  of a c l ie n t 's  cause, the legal arguments that John Marshall presented 
before the courts of V irg in ia  were highly diverse. At times, Marshall 's  
rhetoric was directed toward principles of substantive law. In the case 
of Bai 1 ey y .  Morris ' Estate, for  example, a declaration in detinue stated 
that the executor "detains" slaves but did not allege "possession" of 
them. Marshall argued that for a cause in detinue to succeed, the 
p l a i n t i f f  had to allege "possession." The court agreed. In another
case, Marshall addressed his attention to partnership law, asserting that
207one partner could bind another by his actions (the court disagreed).
Yet another case found Marshall arguing a technical legal point concerning
208the passing of a reversion to slaves by a residuary clause in a w i l l .
I f  the occasion warranted, John Marshall could also turn procedural
techn ica l i t ies  to his c l ien ts '  advantage. Rice v. Jones involved a w i l l
contest that had been resolved in the North Carolina courts, although the
lands at issue were in V irg in ia .  Marshall argued for the ju r isd ic t ion  of
209the V irg in ia  courts over the matter, and won. In Dandridge's Exrs. 
y. A l len , he represented on appeal the defendant below who had lost a 
judgment in detinue for  two slaves. On appeal, Marshall argued that the
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special verdict was not precise enough. He won; the decision was reversed
210and a new t r i a l  ordered. In a case Marshall had inherited from
Edmund Randolph, the key issue was the admission of testimony by a witness
to an assault case. The young lawyer maintained that the witness was an
interested party since the defendants had made him promise to pay part of
the damages i f  a lawsuit resulted from the incident. Again, the court
211agreed with Marshall 's argument.
A question of some in terest is the extent to which Marshall cited 
legal authority— both Bri t ish and American--in the course of his arguments 
before the courts. Positive conclusions concerning Marshall 's reliance  
upon legal authori ties to buttress his arguments at t r i a l  are not possi­
ble. The uneven nature of the surviving documentation of his early l i t i g a ­
tion practice, together with the deficiencies in the reports of these 
cases, preclude rigorous analysis. What can be ascertained, however, is 
that Marshall did commonly re ly  on such authori ties in his presentations 
before the bar of the V irg in ia  courts. Of the cases which permit this
sort of analysis, i t  appears that he cited some form of legal authority
212nearly 50 percent of the time. By fa r  the largest number of
citat ions by the young lawyer pertained to English case law. Marshall
cited English cases which had been handed down as early as 1607, and as
recently as 1781. Moreover, the range of courts quoted was impressive.
By fa r  the most cited court was that of King's (or Queen's) Bench. But
Marshall also rel ied on cases from Chancery, the Exchequer Chamber, Common
213Pleas and Nisi Prius. In addition to formal court cases, he also 
drew on orders of the Privy Council and even grants by the Crown. Other 
sources of legal ammunition were the major English treatises on the law: 
Blackstone, Coke on L i t t l e to n ,  Bacon's Abridgment, and Swinburne on
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W il ls .  Marshall even cited in one case Christopher Saint German's
214dialogue between Doctor and Student.
Neither was i t  uncommon for an attorney to have to come to grips with
V irg in ia  authority  in the course of his t r i a l  practice. In Keisel v.
Donna!ly, for example, the issue on appeal from the Augusta County Court
to the General Court was whether a V irg in ia  law allowing sureties to
215recover damages was applicable in that case. In one interesting case
Marshall was d i re c t ly  involved in the construction of V irg in ia  statutes.
Hannah _v. Davis was an action before the General Court by descendants of
an Indian named Bess. A special verdict of the jury had determined that
Bess had been held as a slave, and the matter at issue involved the status
of Bess's descendants. Marshall argued that a 1682 law making most Indian
servants slaves had been superceded by a 1705 act stating that t r ibu ta ry
Indians should be treated "as i f  . . . an Englishman." The court 
216agreed. In at least one instance, Marshall convinced the court to
depart from English practice and to establish i ts  own ru le .  In
Robertson1s Wi l l , a case heard before the General Court, Marshall argued
for the v a l id i t y  of a wi11 that the testator  had neither written in his
own hand nor signed (although he had assented to i t ) .  The English rule
was that such a w i l l  was inval id .  But the court followed Marshall 's
217reasoning and held the w i l l  enforceable.
While John Marshall unquestionably u t i l i z e d  legal authori t ies to
strengthen his arguments, the p o r t ra i t  would not be complete without
noting that the young advocate did not always re ly  on his own research.
Marshall often looked to other attorneys in th is respect. Nowhere was
this tendency clearer  than when St. George Tucker noted in his summary of
a case, "Marshall advocated the wi l l ,  & re l ied  wholly on the Authorities
218adduced by Carrington."
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Having presented the case before the judge or ju ry ,  Marshall 's next 
legal hurdle was to enforce the judgment, i f  in favor of his c l ie n t ,  or,  
i f  unfavorable, to consider the poss ib i l i ty  of further legal action.
Judgment and Beyond
The termination of the t r i a l  phase of l i t ig a t io n  was the "judgment" of
the court: the o f f i c i a l  determination of the respective rights and claims
219of the part ies .  But there were various routes to this f in a l  determin­
ation. I f  the action had been t r ied  before a ju ry ,  the judgment would be
based upon the ju ry  verdict .  Otherwise the justices of the court formu­
lated the f in a l  decision. In a l l  of John Marshall 's t r i a l  practice, he
l i t ig a te d  approximately one-third of his cases before a jury;  the
220remainder of his t r i a l  advocacy he directed solely to the bench.
Most cases argued before the judges resulted in a clear outcome: over 90
percent of a l l  cases decided by the jud ic ia ry  were unanimous deci-
221sions. When a ju ry  was involved, the verdict was usually of a
general nature: "The defendants have not paid the debt in the declaration
mentioned amounting to four hundred pounds Pennsylvania money of the value
222of three hundred and twenty pounds current money of V irg in ia  . . ."
But sometimes the jury had a more limited function. In Stringer v. 
Burton's Exrs. ,  the attorneys removed from the ju r isd ic t ion  of the jury  
the finding of certain facts: the lawyers "agreed and stated the fo l low­
ing facts in l ieu of a verdict of a Jury therein . . . "  The heart of the 
case was the proper construction of V irg in ia  statutes, a matter within the 
province of the just ices.  Once the General Court had construed the laws,
the "jury was ordered to assess the value of the slaves" at issue in the 
223case. Often the jury was asked to formulate a "special verd ict" - - the
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specific finding of the facts of a case by a ju ry ,  leaving to the court
224the application of the law to the facts thus found. In Tomlin v.
Kelly the jury  found as follows: "we find for the p l a i n t i f f  £100:9:6 1/2
damages i f  the court shall be of the opinion, that an action can be
maintained . . . otherwise we find for the defendant." In turn,  the court
intoned: "This day came the parties by the ir  at torn ies,  and thereupon the
matters of Law arising upon the Special Verdict in th is  cause being argued
i t  seems to the Court that the Law is for the Defendants." The court
225proceeded to award judgment for the defendant.
Whether the f in a l  outcome rested upon a ju ry  verdict or not, the judg­
ment had certain distinguishing character ist ics.  For example, i t  was 
often closely related to the p l a i n t i f f ' s  or ig inal demand. In over 
two-thirds of Marshall 's cases, the ultimate award matched the amount 
sought by the p l a i n t i f f  in his declaration. However, in one quarter of 
the cases, the judgment was for less than the orig inal demand. Surpris­
ingly , in two instances judgment was for more than the p l a i n t i f f ' s
226original request. Moreover, most judgments granted awards in the pre­
vai l ing monetary units of the time: pounds, sh i l l ings and pence. Usually
the award was in "current money," but there were instances of judgments 
stipulating payment in "specie" or "s ter l ing ."  Occasionally the amount 
granted would be stated in terms of another monetary unit of the time,
tobacco. Of course, i f  the l i t ig a t io n  concerned land the award might be
• „ ,,227in "acres."
Normally, the judgment was recorded in a standard format prescribed by 
statute.  When suit had been upon a bond, for  example, the judgment was 
rendered on the penal amount of the bond--usually double the amount of the
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defendant's actual obligation to the p l a i n t i f f ,  plus in terest .  However, 
the judgment contained a provision permitting the defendant to escape this  
penalty. Typical language would be ". . . but this Judgment is to be 
discharged by the payment of [one-half of the penal amount] with Interest  
thereon to be computed a f te r  the rates of f ive  percentum per annum [from 
the date of the disputed transaction] unti l  paid and the damages and
r  4- , . 2 2 8Costs."
The addition of in terest ,  costs and damages to the award was common­
place. The going rate of interest was f ive  percent, usually charged from 
the date of wrongdoing (not the date of the judgment). In addit ion, when 
the p l a i n t i f f  fa i led  to prevail he was often socked with the costs of the 
l i t i g a t io n .  I t  was standard for  a p l a i n t i f f  to pay such expenses when he 
did not prosecute his action. In Henderson v. Brooke, the p l a i n t i f f  
fa i led  to appear a f ter  the ju ry  had been impanelled, so the court ordered 
judgment for the defendant. The court added "that the Defendant . . .
recover against the said P l a i n t i f f  f iv e  sh i l l ings for his non suit . .
229." S im i la r ly ,  in Lewis v. Richardson the court nonsuited the
p l a i n t i f f ,  ordering him to pay the defendant 150 pounds of tobacco and 
230costs. Even when the case went to t r i a l ,  the p l a i n t i f f  was in danger
of incurring such a penalty. In the case of Glascock y.  Dowdal1, a f ter
the jury  found the defendant not gu i l ty  in an action of trespass on the
case, the court stated: "Therefore i t  is considered by the Court that the
P l a i n t i f f  take nothing by his B i l l ,  but for his fa lse clamour . . . the
Defendant . . . recover against the said P l a i n t i f f  his Costs by him about
231his defense in that behalf expended." But i t  was not always the 
p l a i n t i f f  who bore the costs of l i t ig a t io n ;  defendants were assessed 
costs in nearly 20 percent of the actions (in one instance the burden was
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232divided equally: "The part ies to bear the cost"). When a defendant
lost ,  damages were sometimes assessed in addition to the recovery,
in terest  and costs. Usually these were nominal—damages of "one
penny"--apparently to demonstrate that the defendant had t ru ly  been in the 
233wrong. Normally, court costs were a combination of currency and
234tobacco: "50 s h i l l in g s ,  or 500 lbs. of tobCacco]." Sometimes,
special assessments would supplement the standard court costs. In Kuhn v.
Hoomes, the losing party also paid "witnesses attendance 6126 lbs tob &
2353 [s h i11ings]" and "execution 23 lbs tob." At least at times i t
appears that John Marshall as attorney acted as a receiver for the costs
assessed. His account book l i s ts  such receipts as f iv e  pounds "From
236Parsons fees taxed [ in  a suit against] Johnstons Exrs."
A clear pattern emerges when one looks at the judgments awarded in Mar­
s h a l l 's  l i t ig a t io n  practice. Over his f i r s t  eight years of t r i a l  work, the
237p l a i n t i f f  won judgment approximately two-thirds of the time. Recall ­
ing the e a r l ie r  discussion of the types of actions in Marshall 's practice,  
this  is not surprising. Many "debt" su its ,  for example, were based upon 
bonds executed by the defendant, which in e f fect  admitted the obligation.  
Thus i t  was not unexpected that the p l a i n t i f f  won the overwhelming
majority of these cases— over 92 percent. Many other causes of actions
238had similar  ra t ios .
Having won a judgment, however, did not assure a p l a i n t i f f  sa t is fac­
t ion .  He had to secure i ts  "execution," that is ,  i ts  implementation. 
Marshall 's practice i l lu s t ra te s  several ways in which th is could be accom­
plished. I f  a judgment debtor proved r e c a lc i t ra n t , the normal procedure 
was for  the p l a i n t i f f ' s  attorney to secure a wr i t  of execution from the 
court. In one of Marshall 's cases, a f te r  the p l a i n t i f f  had won an
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ejectment action, the court specified that "a wr i t  of habere facias Posses­
sionem [rough translat ion:  to make to have possession] is awarded to
239cause [the p l a i n t i f f ]  to have possession." A more common method was 
by w r i t  of f i e r i  facias. This was a jud ic ia l  order to the sh e r i f f  com­
manding him to levy the amount of the judgment from the goods and chattels
240of the judgment debtor. Marshall 's records reveal that he played an
active role in th is  phase of the l i t ig a t io n  process. Besides several
notations referr ing to actions in "attachment," he noted at one point that
"I have in my hands on the [execution against] Goode [£ ]  42-5 & the amount
of the [execution] v. Wood." Marshall further noted of these executions
that they were "both paid o f f . " ^
The losing party also was not without remedy. For instance, he could
delay execution on a judgment for a term by giving a "forthcoming" or
"replevy" bond. This protected the property of the judgment debtor from
execution by assuring that the property would be forthcoming when re- 
242quired. The most immediate substantive legal tool available to a
party facing execution of a judgment was the injunction. This was a wr i t
issued by a court of equity prohibit ing the p l a i n t i f f  from going forward,
and could only be u t i l i z e d  i f  execution of the judgment would be unjust or 
243inequitable. John Marshall 's t r i a l  practice provides examples of 
this sort of s i tuat ion .  In Overstreet v. Randolph, Marshall 's c l i e n t ,  
Overstreet, had contracted to pay Randolph £300 for a slave. The s e l le r ,  
Randolph, had acted so unfa i r ly  in th is  transaction that under normal c i r ­
cumstances Overstreet would have been discharged from his obligation to 
pay. But Randolph had assigned (transferred the contract to a good-faith 
purchaser (one who knew nothing of Randolph's fraud),  who secured a 
judgment against Overstreet for  fa i l in g  to pay the contractual amount.
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Marshall,  on behalf of Overstreet, sought an injunction to stay the execu­
tion of this judgment (the court ult imately refused to grant the injunc­
t io n ) .  Barrett  v. Floyd presented a more complicated s ituat ion . In that  
case a Brit ish merchant ship had stranded and sprung a leak in the 
Chesapeake. Floyd had boarded her and begun to salvage the cargo.
Barrett also appeared, and the two decided to work together. They agreed 
that i f  the ship were thereafter  determined to be a "prize" under 
admiralty law, Barrett  would get a specified percentage of what was sa l­
vaged. I f  i t  were not constituted a pr ize ,  Barrett should get only what­
ever he carried o f f  the ship. Most of the cargo was thus saved. The ship 
was subsequently declared a pr ize ,  and Barrett  was awarded the agreed-upon 
percentage. But th is did not please him, since as i t  turned out he had 
carried off  more than the agreed percentage of the cargo. To improve his 
lo t ,  Barrett inst i tuted a suit  at law in the county court and obtained a
judgment against Floyd. When Barrett sought execution of th is  judgment,
244Floyd obtained an injunction in the High Court of Chancery. Mar­
sha l l 's  records contain several references to his part ic ipation in "injunc­
tion" actions (twenty-nine instances are noted); and, while i t  is impos­
sib le  to assume that a l l  were post-judgment s i tuat ions,  these would appear 
to have been the most common use of that w r i t .
Of course e ither  side also had the option of taking an appeal from the 
decision of the t r i a l  court. When a party chose th is course, there 
appeared to be a f a i r l y  standard procedure which was followed. As an ad­
junct to the appeal, Marshall would often seek a w r i t  of supersedeas.
This, in e f fe c t ,  prohibited the court below from issuing an execution on 
245the judgment. Meanwhile, the appellant also would execute an "appeal 
bond," an obligation guaranteeing the winning party below satisfact ion of
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246his judgment i f  the appeal fa i le d .  When the appeal came before the
higher court, a typical entry in the court records would re la te  that "This
day came the part ies by th e ir  Counsel and this cause was heard upon the
transcript  of the record, sundry exhibits now produced and the arguments
247of Counsel on both sides . . . .  The appellate court would proceed 
to render f in a l  judgment in the matter.
We have now peeked over John Marshall 's shoulder and glimpsed him at 
work in his law practice,  both in his o f f ice  and in the courtroom. But 
the l i f e  of a young lawyer establishing a practice in V irg in ia 's  capital  
c i ty  inevitably engulfed Marshall in other a c t iv i t ie s  related to his law 
practice,  but not of i t .  To these we now turn.
CHAPTER FOUR 
RELATED ACTIVITIES
John Marshall spent the major portion of his early professional l i f e  
performing legal duties for a growing c l ie n te le .  But the very nature of 
being a lawyer in late eighteenth-century Virg in ia  forced upon him 
a c t iv i t ie s  which were not inherently within the scope of a law practice.  
The most obvious of these tangential duties sprang from Marshall 's  
relat ionship with his c l ien ts .  Individuals accustomed to relying upon 
the young lawyer for legal advice and representation quite natura l ly  
also turned to him for assistance in handling other aspects of th e i r  
l ives .  Moreover, the prominence resulting from a successful law 
practice in the state capital almost inevitably  threw John Marshall into 
the p o l i t ic a l  arena. F in a l ly ,  Marshall 's f a m i l i a r i t y  with the local 
business climate and the real estate market led him to a role as 
businessman and speculator.
Assisting Clients
John Marshall 's legal clients re l ied  upon him for a number of 
non-legal tasks. One of the most v is ib le  of these was his role as a 
sort of "land agent<'r  Marshall became deeply involved in assisting in­
dividuals in the ir  rush to secure land in the western, "Kentucky" 
regions of V irg in ia .  At times his assistance was no more than ensuring 
that his former comrades-in-arms received the land bounty c e r t i f ic a te s
58.
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that were the ir  due. There are numerous examples of Marshall attesting
248that a former soldier had served under him during the Revolution.
At other times Marshall handled the entire  real estate transaction for
his c l ie n t ,  as when Charles Tyler of Prince William County granted the
young lawyer a power of attorney to dispose of Ty ler 's  Kentucky 
249land. We have seen how Marshall acted as an intermediary between
250his surveyor father and a land claimant. Perhaps most representa­
t ive  of his role as "land agent" was the assistance he provided James 
Monroe in 1784. In January Marshall promised Monroe that he would seek 
out the Speaker of the House of Delegates, John Tyler ,  in an e f fo r t  to 
expedite Monroe's land bounty c e r t i f i c a te .  In February Marshall noted 
that things were moving apace, informing his c l ien t  that "four Dollars 
were expended on your Land warrant which is now in the hands of the 
Surveyor." By December, Monroe was seeking his attorney's advice on the 
disposition of his western lands. Marshall responded: "I  do not know
what to say to your scheme of sell ing out. I f  you can execute i t  you 
w il l  have made a very capital sum, i f  you can reta in your lands you w i l l  
be poor during l i f e  unless you remove to the western country but you 
w i l l  have secured for  posterity  an immense fortune. I should prefer the
sell ing business & i f  you adopt i t  I think you have fixed on a very 
251proper pr ice."
In addition to his ef for ts  as a land agent, Marshall also acted as 
business agent and f inancia l manager for  many of his c l ien ts .  I t  was not 
uncommon for  the advocate to serve as a purchasing agent. In 1787 Mar­
shall purchased "one negroe wench named Dicey with her child" from John 
B. Johnson for seventy pounds, then immediately transferred his acquisi­
tion to his c l ie n t :  "For the within mentioned sum of seventy pounds
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. . . I bargain and sell the within mentioned slaves to Jaquelin Ambler 
252Esquire." The young lawyer acted s im ila r ly  as intermediary between
William Heth and several Richmond mercantile firms with respect to the
253purchasing power of Heth's tobacco. Marshall proved himself to be 
a tough negotiator in the interests of his c l ien ts .  While James Monroe 
attended Congress in Annapolis his creditors began to get rest ive.  Mar­
shall wrote Monroe: "I am pressed warmly by Ege for  money & your old
LandLady Mrs. Shera begins now to be a l i t t l e  clamorous. I shall be
obliged I apprehend to negotiate your warrants at last at a dis- 
254count." But a month la te r  Marshall was ecstat ic .  "I have been man­
euvering amazingly to turn your warrants into cash. I f  I succeed I 
shall think myself a f i r s t  rate speculator." Marshall 's business acumen 
is suggested by a marginal note in the same le t t e r :  "The ten shi l l ings
added to the £100 is the discount on the negotiation of the b i l l  I have
255insisted on your being allowed fo r ."  The extent to which Marshall
immersed himself in the business a f fa irs  of his clients is evidenced by 
a remarkable le t te r  to Arthur Lee. The lawyer begins the correspondence 
by noting that "of the tobacco you le f t  in my hands I have sold eight 
Hoxheads . . . "  Most of the rest of the le t t e r  Marshall devoted to ex­
plaining why he sold the tobacco one sh i l l ing  under the market price.
In the process, he demonstrated his business a b i l i t i e s .  " I t  is my hope 
& opinion that Tobacco is r is ing in i ts  price,"  Marshall wrote, "but as 
your tobacco pays a monthly tax in consequence of i ts  age, loses in i ts  
weight, & is en t i re ly  at your own r isk ,  I thought i t  not safe to hazard 
the passing away of the present market." Marshall went on to explain 
why he had sold under market. He reasoned that the age of Lee's tobacco 
"obliged me too to be content with 35 [s h i l l in g s ]  for your tobacco at a
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time when the current price for your commodoty (where the notes are new) 
was 36 s h i l l in g s ."  Moreover, Marshall feared the recurrence of a recent 
example of price f ix ing  by tobacco buyers which the lawyer said "was
occasioned by a combination among the Merchants & such combinations may
. , M 256again take place."
Marshall also acted as a f isca l  agent on behalf of his c l ien ts .  He
often functioned as a banker, receiving large amounts of money which he
credited to his c l ien ts '  accounts. In December 1784, for instance,
Marshall "Received for Broadhead on interest [and m i l i ta ry ]  warrants "a
257tota l  of over 1200 pounds. The young "banker" also provided advice 
as to the market value of warrants, so that clients could determine when 
to l iquidate the ir  holdings. Marshall wrote to William Heth: "Pryor,
the other day wished to purchase a f ine horse from Colo. T. M. Ran­
dolph, his price was £100 in cash payable in six months or £130 in
M i l i t a r y  c e r t i f ic a te s .  I t e l l  you th is that you may attend to the dis-  
25 8posal of yours." The lawyer-f iscal consultant even went so fa r  as 
to lend money to his c l ien ts .  His account book contains several r e fe r ­
ences such as "From Mr. Nelson for  money lent him . . . ," and "James
259Alexander . . . repaid me . . ." The banker's role played by the 
young advocate extended to disbursing funds from his c l ients '
"account." Marshall wrote Monroe: "Let me assure you that I w i l l  punc­
tu a l ly  comply with every requis it ion you may make on pecuniary subjects
260or any other within my reach." Another time he wrote the same
c l ien t  that "Banks has applied to me for a considerable sum on your 
account but I presume your l e t t e r  to him was on that subject. I hurry 
every applicant as well as possible." S im i lar ly ,  Marshall once 
directed an acquaintance to "Give my compliments to Colo. Mercer & le t
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him know that there now lies in the Treasury for him £100 of which I
262w i l l  give immediate information to his brother in Fredericksburg."
Marshall 's services to his clients did not stop at business and
financial  dealings. Many seeking special favors or priv i leges turned to
him as a conduit to the centers of power. Marshall apparently had the
ear of the governor. In a le t te r  to John Alexander, Marshall mentioned
that he would speak to Governor Randolph "about the amendment to your 
263b i l l . "  S im i la r ly ,  the advocate intervened with the governor on
behalf of James Wilkinson when the la t te r  sought a passport for safe
passage down the Mississippi River. But i t  was not to be. " I t  is with
a great deal of mort i f icat ion I t e l l  you that I have fa i led  in obtaining
the passport I applied fo r ,"  admitted Marshall, ". . . the Governor . .
. told me to-day that to grant the passport as an o f f i c i a l  act was
en t i re ly  improper because i t  could only extend to the l imits of
264V irg in ia .  . . .  I am much chagrined at my disappointment." Mar­
shall sometimes advanced the causes of those seeking appointment to
public o f f ice .  In 1785 he promised to place George Muter's name in nomi-
265nation for  a judgeship in Kentucky, i f  circumstances permitted. At 
other times Marshall discouraged such entreat ies.  When William Heth 
sought a preferred appointment from the Council of State,  his lawyer ad­
vised against such course, stating "I shall not therefore mention this
266matter to Monroe or Lawson unless you wish me to do so." Marshall 
also petit ioned the V irg in ia  General Assembly in the interests of 
certain c l ien ts .  For example, in November 1787 he drafted a pet i t ion on 
behalf of John K el ly ,  whose house had been occupied by V irg in ia  troops 
during the war. The lawyer alleged that "While they were in possession 
of the said house they burnt i t  down. Your pet i t ioner  prays that the
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honble. the genl. assembly may take his case into consideration & grant 
him r e l i e f  . . .
I t  was not a coincidence that John Marshall 's clients saw in him the
poss ib i l i ty  of gaining favor within the circles of power. During his
early years at the bar young Marshall was closely connected to the
ruling e l i t e  of the Commonwealth. This was in large part due to his 
p o l i t ic a l  actions, which in turn were an outgrowth of his legal 
practice.
P o l i t ic a l  A c t iv i t ie s
No lawyer of prominence could avoid becoming deeply involved in 
p o l i t ic s ,  and John Marshall was no exception. He was elected or 
appointed to numerous public positions during his time at the Richmond 
bar. For a br ie f  time— from late 1782 until  the spring of 1784—Mar­
shall was a member of the governor's executive council,  the Council of 
State. In that role he served as advisor and counsellor to the gover­
nor. In February 1783, for  instance, the Council considered a complaint 
to the governor that a magistrate for New Kent County was unf i t  and 
should be removed. Marshall and his fellow counsellors decided that the 
law permitting the governor to look into the actions of magistrates was 
"repugnant to the Act of Government, contrary to the fundamental
principles of our constitution and d i re c t ly  opposite to the general
268tenor of our Laws." On another occasion Marshall and James Monroe 
served as a kind of subcommittee to examine the progress made in the 
settlement of accounts against the continental government. The two were 
not pleased with what they found. "Upon enquiry & examination . . .  we
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have reason to suspect great abuses have taken place and very dishon­
ourable misapplications of the public money; We therefore take the 
Liberty  to suggest to your Excellency & the Council the propriety of 
making some pointed exertion to call  those who have been thus employd
and entrusted with the public property in every line to an immediate 
269Settlement." But a l l  did not go well with the young lawyer's ven­
ture into the top echelon of government. The local ju d ic ia ry  sought his 
resignation, apparently because by continuing his law practice Marshall 
threatened the ir  independence in deciding a case where one of the 
lawyers was a formal advisor to the governor. Marshall eventually 
succumbed to this pressure, writing James Monroe in April 1784 that "I  
am no longer a member of the Executive, the opinion of the Judges with
respect to a Counsellors standing at the bar determined me to re t i re
270from the Council board." He elaborated in a le t te r  to Arthur Lee
that "the uncertainty o f ,  together with the disagreeable circumstances
attending publick o f f ice  have induced me to resign my seat in the
271Executive & I am now standing at the General Court bar."
Marshall had begun his p o l i t ic a l  career in the House of Delegates.
He had completed his legal studies and l e f t  the army by 1781, but he
found no legal business to pursue (most of the courts were closed due to
the Brit ish invasion). Consequently, he engaged in p o l i t ic s .  He ran
for a seat in the leg is la ture from Fauquier County, and won. The House
did not pay very well (ten sh i l l ings a day), but at least i t  paid
something, and at any rate i t  was an important step for an ambitious 
272young lawyer. Marshall f i r s t  took the oath of o f f ice  in May 1782, 
and he remained a member of the House for most of the early years of his 
law practice (from 1782-1784 he was a delegate from Fauquier; a f ter
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1786, from Henrico County [Richmond]). Marshall apparently was a
d i l igen t  member of the leg is la ture .  Pay vouchers for the sessions of
1782 and 1784 reveal that the young leg is la tor  averaged over one hundred
273days a year in attendance. He was immediately appointed to the
important Committee for Courts of Justice, and in la ter  sessions was
also a member of the standing committees on Propositions and Grievances,
274and Privileges and Elections.
The duties and services Marshall performed while in the leg is la ture
were varied. Predictably, he was active in drafting b i l l s .  As early  as
1782 Marshall assisted in the drafting of a b i l l  which made i t  easier
275for persons to enter "vacant" lands. Most of his other drafting
ef for ts  involved changes to the commonwealth's court system. In 1784 he
authored a b i l l  designed to counteract the improper granting of
c e r t i f ic a te s  by county courts. In 1786 a proposal written by Marshall
(although he was not a member of the legis la ture at the time) would have
restructured the General Court's criminal ju r is d ic t io n ,  while in 1788 he
drafted a b i l l  which permitted lawyers to practice in both in fe r io r  and 
276superior courts. Marshall also part ic ipated actively in the work
of le g is la t iv e  committees. In addition to his regular committee duties,
the leadership entrusted him with special assignments. In his f i r s t
session, the young leg is la tor  was appointed to a committee to examine
the statutes of V irg in ia  with an eye toward recodif icat ion.  In 1784 he
joined Spencer Roane on a committee preparing a b i l l  to revise the
277county court system. Marshall also part ic ipated on several 
important leg is la t iv e  commissions. For example, when V irg in ia  had ceded 
the Northwest Te rr i to ry  to the federal government, i t  had been agreed
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that certain of the s tate 's  expenses would be reimbursed. But the f i r s t
settlement o f fer  was considered by most Virginians to be fa r  too low.
Marshall was appointed to a commission to investigate the matter. The
report of Marshall 's group was str ident:  ". . . unless Congress w i l l  .
. . reimburse V irg in ia  the amount of which she has actually and bona
f id e ,  expended and paid for the conquest and protection of the ceded
North Western T e rr i to ry ,  [we recommend that V i rg in ia ]  withhold a l l
monies on the requisit ions of Congress, u n t i l l  such amount shall have
been reimbursed . . .
Nor was John Marshall 's career l imited to p o l i t ic a l  positions at the
state level;  he held places of importance at the local level as well .
In July 1785, the Richmond voters chose him to f i l l  a seat on the c i ty 's
governing body, the Common Hal l .  The duties of the Common Hall were
mainly leg is la t ive  in character, and i t  is clear from the minutes of
that body that Marshall 's part ic ipation in i ts  deliberations was active 
279and regular. At the organizational meeting of his f i r s t  term on
the Common H a l l ,  Marshall was also chosen to be the Recorder for  the
c i ty  of Richmond. This was akin to being the "c i ty  attorney;" in
addition to keeping records, he was expected to prosecute actions on
280behalf of the c i ty .  The of f ice  of Recorder gave Marshall the
status of "magistrate" and empowered him to take oaths. For example, in
1787 the Recorder affirmed that a Nathaniel Wilkinson had appeared
before him and sworn that he had received no money while he was
281commander of the Henrico County m i l i t i a .  As Recorder, Marshall was 
also expected to part ic ipate  in the a c t iv i t ie s  of the other governing 
body of the c i t y ,  the Hustings Court. The Hustings Court was somewhat 
comparable to a county court, exercising authority over many criminal
67.
and c iv i l  matters arising within the limits of the c i ty  of 
282Richmond. An example of the type of case which came before the 
Hustings Court was that of the Commonwealth v. Garrett  and Johnson.
This was an arraignment of two defendants charged with "Burglary and 
felony, in breaking and entering the dwelling house of John Tisdall . . 
." The Hustings Court decided to remand the defendants to the next
session of the General Court; in the meantime, they were consigned to
. ... 283 ja i  1.
John Marshall 's active involvement in law and po l i t ics  did not 
occupy so much of his time as to preclude business enterprises in his 
own behalf.  Indeed, the young professional's law practice uniquely 
situated him to speculate in western lands.
Land Speculation
John Marshall was pa r t icu la r ly  well situated to take advantage of 
the opportunities presented by Kentucky land speculation. The same c i r ­
cumstances which caused real estate to loom large in his law practice 
gave Marshall an edge in securing investment property for himself. His 
residence at Richmond f a c i l i t a t e d  access to the Virg in ia  land o f f ice ,  as 
well as serving as a central point for the purchase of treasury warrants 
from V irg inia  residents who wished to assign them to him. At the same
time, his fa ther 's  position as surveyor of Fayette County (Kentucky)
284provided him with accurate information concerning available lands.
Marshall acquired most of his holdings in two ways. The f i r s t  was 
through m i l i ta ry  warrants issued to him as a veteran of the Revolu­
tionary War. In 1782, for example, he received "four thousand Acres of
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Land, due unto the said John Marshall in consideration of his Services
285for three Years as Captain in the army . . . "  The second method
of obtaining western lands was by the purchase of "treasury warrants"
(warrants issued by the state treasury upon payment of a certain sum for
the acquisition of acreage). Marshall 's records contain several
documents i l lu s t ra t in g  the procedure followed. Normally, Marshall
obtained land warrants either in his own name from the land of f ice  or by
assignment from a purchaser. The warrant was then sent to his father in
Kentucky, who would enter the acreage in his son's name and arrange for
a survey. After the land had been surveyed (and i f  a l l  was in order) ,
the land offices would issue a "grant" confirming Marshall 's  
286ownership. In a l l ,  John Marshall obtained grants to over 40,000
acres in the Kentucky lands. Moreover, he assisted family members in
287obtaining another 10,000 acres of the western lands. In addition
to acquiring land, Marshall also may have realized some monetary income
from his land warrants. The lawyer recorded frequent receipts in his
account book indicating income "by my warrants," to ta l l in g  over six
hundred pounds during the period studied. These entries are somewhat
288puzzling, but they may represent the sale of land warrants.
Not a l l  of Marshall 's real estate acquisitions were for purposes of 
speculation. In 1785 Marshall 's father deeded his son the family  
plantation of Oak H i l l  in Fauquier County. Two years la te r ,  young 
Marshall purchased another 268 acres in the v ic in i ty .  The aspiring 
professional also acquired in 1785 "Lot 480" on fashionable "Shockoe
H i l l "  in Richmond. This was eventually to become the s i te  of his home
. . 289and o f f ic e .
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The acquisition of a lot on which to permanently locate brings up 
yet another facet of Marshall 's l i f e  which served as an adjunct to his 
professional career: his active part ic ipation in Richmond community
a f fa i rs .
Community A c t iv i t ies
The prominence which John Marshall attained as a result  of his suc­
cessful career in business, law and po l i t ics  natural ly  drew him into the 
vortex of community a c t iv i ty .  He was continually investing in worth­
while causes. One popular endeavor was the e f fo r t  to improve the naviga­
tion of V i rg in ia 's  r ivers into the in te r io r  of the state. Marshall was
a subscriber to both the James River Company and the "Potowmac River
290Co.," investing nearly one hundred pounds in those ventures. He
also contributed to the Library Society, the Episcopal church, the local
291chapter of the Masonic temple, and a Richmond p o l i t ic a l  club.
After a f i r e  level led most of Richmond in 1787 (Marshall contributed £21
to "sufferers by f i r e " ) ,  the attorney joined forty - three  other cit izens
as founding members of a f i r e  company, because of "the present
defenceless situation of the C ity ,  and our total in a b i l i t y  to provide
292against Accidents by f i r e . "  He was also a charter member of the
V irg in ia  Constitutional Society, an organization "for the purpose of
preserving & handing down to posterity  those pure and sacred principles
of l ib e r ty  . . .  by givings free and frequent information to the mass of
the people" (the members were expected to submit an appropriate essay
293every six months). An indication of the esteem in which the
community held John Marshall as a result  of such a c t iv i t ie s  is shown by 
his nomination as an o f f ice r  in the m i l i t i a .  Marshall earned the
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commission due to the "special trust and confidence, which is reposed in
294your f i d e l i t y ,  courage, a c t iv i ty ,  and good conduct."
John Marshall 's attention was not always r ivet ted  upon up l i f t ing
civ ic  matters. He also maintained--and evidently enjoyed--an active
social l i f e  within his community. Being a prominent lawyer, an active
po l i t ic ia n  and a gregarious person, Marshall joined in many of the
social a c t iv i t ie s  of Richmond. One of the highlights of the social
season was the series of "Assemblies," or ba l ls ,  held every two weeks in
the winter and supported by subscriptions. Marshall 's account book
records his regular contribution to these a f fa i rs  and he apparently got
his money's worth. He reported, "I have been setting up a l l  night at an
Assembly. We have them in Richmond regularly  once a fo r tn igh t .  The
last was a b r i l l i a n t  one . . . Never did I see such a collection of
handsome Ladies. I do not believe that Versai lles or saint James ever
295displayed so much beauty." Marshall also act ive ly  part ic ipated in
several "clubs," such as a social club at Formicola's tavern and a group
296which met occasionally to enjoy a "barbacue." Marshall c lear ly
enjoyed a c t iv i t ie s  re lat ing to drinking and gambling. He was a regular
subscriber to the "Jockie club," which sponsored horse races in May and
October. At one May meeting he noted that he "lost at race [ t h i r t y - f o u r  
297s h i l l in g s ] . "  Marshall wagered extensively, and kept a record of
his gambling gains and losses. On the debit side, the young lawyer
recorded such setbacks as "lost at whist, £19;" "lost  at backgammon,
£6;" " r a f f l in g ,  28 [ s h i l l in g s ] ; "  and "lost  at b i l l i a r d s ,  £3." In a l l ,
Marshall l is ted  gambling losses of over seventy pounds, and winnings of
298only twenty-three pounds. In addit ion, the consumption of sp ir i ts  
was an obvious part of the young attorney's social l i f e .  Several
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account book entries refer  to evenings spent in the Richmond taverns,
such as the twenty-three sh il l ings Marshall recorded he "spent at 
299Trowers." He also kept an ample domestic supply. In the years
studied, Marshall expended over one hundred pounds on purchases of wine,
rum, punch, gin and b e e r . * ^
Marshall c lear ly  delighted in the social swirl of Richmond. In
February of 1784 he wrote James Monroe that "the excessive cold weather
has operated l ike magic on our youth. They feel the necessity of
a r t i f i c i a l  heat, & quite wearied with lying alone, a l l  are treading the
301broad road to Matrimony." Marshall often urged others to do the
same. He once wrote George Muter: "I suppose you have before this
collected a l l  the comfortable things of this world except one to share
them with you. How do you feel on that subject? Are you not beginning
302to think t is  time to take up consideration of that subject?"
Marshall had a humorous way of alluding to such delicate  topics. He
told William Pierce that "You are in a Country where your gal lantry may
be serviceable in peace as in war. I know your s k i l l  in maneuvering
under the banners of Venus & I doubt not but several hearts can t e s t i f y  
303your success." Marshall entertained Monroe with a hilarious  
description of a local courtship. "Tabby Eppes has grown quite fa t  and 
buxom, her charms are renovated & to see her & to love her are now 
synonimous. She has within these six weeks seen in her t ra in  at least a 
score of M i l i ta ry  & c iv i l  characters . . . [which] have a l ternate ly  
bowed before her & been discarded. Carrington t is  said has drawn off  
his forces in order to refresh them & has marched up to Cumberland where 
he w i l l  in a l l  human probabil i ty  be reinforced with the dignif ied  
character of Legis lator.  Webb has returnd to the charge & many think
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from th e ir  simil i tude of manners and appetites that they were certa in ly  
designd for each other.
From his ef for ts  at establishing a law o f f ic e ,  through the 
hurly-burly  of a successful legal practice, to his associated r ise  
vibrant member of his community, we have followed young Marshall, 






JOHN MARSHALL AS LAWYER
Any attempt to assess the professional capabi l i t ies  of an attorney 
such as John Marshall is fraught with p e r i l .  The i n i t i a l  stumbling 
block is also the largest: i f  Marshall was indeed a "good lawyer"—
compared to whom and by what cr i te r ia?  A t ru ly  adequate evaluation 
would require in-depth analyses of other "leading" lawyers of the 
Richmond bar in the 1780s, thus placing the a c t iv i t ie s  of John Marshall 
in proper context. Since this is fa r  beyond the scope of this study, 
what is le f t  is an impressionistic view, a lbe it  one based on bits of 
solid information. For example, the growth of Marshall 's practice can 
be c lear ly  documented, as can his success rate in the cases he l i t i ­
gated. Moreover, there exist some actions by contemporaries that  
suggest his standing in the legal community. Beyond that ,  however, one 
is l e f t  only the subjective impressions, however strong, which stem 
from intimate f a m i l i a r i t y  with the source materia l.  Nonetheless, the 
e f fo r t  is worthwhile, i f  only because the study of Marshall 's law 
practice has so rarely  been approached in a systematic manner. Any 
conclusions based upon such analysis represent an advance over previous 
writ ings.
The most objective of the approaches to the analysis of Marshall 's 
a b i l i t i e s  is provided by a study of the growth of his law practice in 
the years 1780-1788. Because such an analysis depends upon the growth
73.
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of Marshall 's income as well as his caseload, there is need, f i r s t ,  of 
a br ie f  excursion into the nature of legal fees in the practice of John 
Marshal 1.
Legal Fees
The overriding r e a l i t y  of legal fees in the early years of Mar­
sh a l l 's  practice was the fact  that they were fixed by law. The General 
Assembly in 1782 had revived a 1761 law which set statutory limits on 
the fees lawyers could charge for  various services. The statute estab­
lished a cei l ing of f i f t y  sh i l l ings (£2-10) on "any suit  at 
common-law," and f ive  pounds "in a l l  chancery suits , or . . . actions,
where the t i t l e  or bounds of land shall or may come into question 
305. . . ." While some fees c lear ly  exceeded the statutory l im i t  for  
one reason or another, such a res tr ic t ion  understandably limited the 
prof i ts  of V irg in ia  lawyers of the period.
Another important facet of legal fees in the practice of John Mar­
shall was the method of th e ir  payment. The overwhelming majority of 
fees were paid in the prevailing monetary units of the time: pounds,
sh i l l ings and pence. Occasionally, however, there would be a tw ist .
In December 1784, Marshall received "From Mr. Wm. Brown 3 Guineas," 
which he translated into £4-4. On another occasion the lawyer recorded 
"From Mr. G. Pickett  fees pd. in his store." George Pickett  was a Rich­
mond merchant, and apparently paid Marshall in kind from the items in 
306his store. I t  appears that as a general rule Marshall demanded 
that his legal fees be paid in advance. Indeed the young lawyer went 
so fa r  as to make this e x p l ic i t  when he joined with other lawyers in 
publishing a notice to that e f fec t :  "WE BEG LEAVE TO INFORM those,
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who may wish to employ us in the business of the Court of Appeals, High
Court of Chancery, or the General Court, that we have pledged ourselves
to each other, not to take any cause af ter  the 1st day of January next,
without the fee and tax of the writ  in hand. We except, however, the
cases, in which we choose to engage g r a t is . Those c l ien ts ,  whose
punctuality we have no reason to doubt, w i l l  consider us, as compelled
to involve them in the same resolution, from the pain of making
307invidious d is t inct ions."  Once the fee had been received, Marshall
would (a t  least sometimes) issue a receipt:  "Reed, from Mr. Samuel
Dabny fo r ty -e igh t  shi l l ings for a suit inst i tuted by him in the Genl.
308Court against John Hawkins." Sometimes the i n i t i a l  fee proved
excessive, and Marshall would refund a portion of i t .  On July 20,
1784, the advocate received f ive  pounds from Robert Price for the
f i l i n g  of two appeals. In October of that year Marshall noted that he
309"Returned [£2-14 to] Mr. Price to be deducted from fees."
Despite the notice requiring a l l  fees to be paid in advance, i t  is 
clear that Marshall often accepted payments on an installment basis. A 
typical example is the case of Cock v_. Markham. In October 1787 Mar­
shall had received a fee to prosecute this appeal. Then in April 1788
another fee for  the same l i t ig a t io n  appeared in his account book with
310the annotation "balance appeal." S im i la r ly ,  in the case of Priddy 
v_. Richardson, Marshall received a fee of eighteen shi l l ings in Sep­
tember 1787. The following May, with the "suit at issue" he received 
311another £1-12. Marshall also accepted other sorts of fee arrange­
ments. Occasionally he received a "retainer" from a c l ie n t ,  obligating
312him to represent that c l ien t  in future legal matters. Another 
case appeared to be on a contingent fee basis. Marshall recorded an
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entry "From Mann v. Caperton caveat [ £ l - 8 ] - - i n  part (to receive £10 on 
313recovering) ."
Regardless of how the fees were collected, John Marshall 's income 
from fees received for his legal endeavors increased yearly. This 
expansion of the young lawyer's practice provides one objective  
cr i te r ion  of his r is ing position in the profession.
Growth of Practice
When John Marshall f i r s t  settled in Richmond and began his profes­
sional career, very l i t t l e  of his income derived from his law 
practice. Most of his sustenance came from his position on the Council 
of State and as a member of the House of Delegates. The tota l income 
Marshall received from these positions is unclear. From 1783 to 1785, 
however, he made several entries in his account book concerning income 
received "by my c iv i l  l i s t  warrants." This is a reference to his pay 
for service on the Council, and i t  amounted to a considerable sum.
Marshall 's income from this source rose from £100 in 1783 to £120 in
3141784 to nearly £180 in 1785. In addition to th is ,  he received as
a member of the House of Delegates a salary of ten sh i l l ings a day plus
trave l l ing  expenses. In November 1784, for  instance, Marshall received
a pay voucher e n t i t l in g  him to twenty pounds for "40 days attendance,"
an additional £2-14 for " t ravel l ing  135 miles" to and from Fauquier
315County, and two sh i l l in g s ,  sixpence for "ferr iages ."  While his 
records for the years 1782-1785 are far  from complete, Marshall earned 
at a minimum an additional £160 for his service in the House of Dele-
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The records of Marshall 's caseload and his income from the practice
of law reveal the early importance of his supplementary leg is la t ive
earnings; they also il luminate his rising standing in his profession.
No evidence remains of any legal fees earned by Marshall in 1782. In
the next year the struggling young attorney earned but f i f te e n  pounds
on six cases. By 1784 a dramatic sh i f t  had occurred. In that year
Marshall handled over one hundred cases and earned over £400 in the
process. From then on his practice increased impressively. In 1785
and 1786 Marshall averaged 220 cases and earned an annual income of
over £750. By 1787 the r is ing lawyer handled over 350 cases and his
income exceeded £1000. Marshall maintained that pace in the f i r s t  half
of 1788. In those f i r s t  eight years of practice, Marshall recorded
317over a thousand fees and earned nearly £4000. Unquestionably the 
once struggling attorney had carved out for himself a busy and lucra­
t iv e  career. By 1787 the now-established lawyer found himself forced 
to decline an of f ice  in the local m i l i t i a .  “ I . . . coud only be in­
duced to decline acting under so honorable an appointment by a convic­
tion that the immense load of professional business under which I at
present labor woud render i t  impossible for me to discharge the duties 
,,318
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One reason that John Marshall 's law practice increased so dramati­
ca l ly  may have been simple: he won cases. This suggests the second 
objective measure of Marshall 's legal a b i l i t i e s :  the degree of his
success in representing his c l ien ts '  interests.
78.
Success Rate
In analyzing the outcomes of his cases, the conclusion is 
inescapable that Marshall successfully represented his c l ients '  
in terests .  Over the years of th is  study Marshall won two of every 
three cases in which he part ic ipated.  His a b i l i t y  is further  i l lu m i ­
nated by tracing the outcomes of those cases involving other 
attorneys. When Marshall acted as the sole counsel in l i t i g a t i o n ,  he 
won 63 percent of his cases. When he collaborated with other a t to r ­
neys, his success rate was near 80 percent. S ign i f ican t ly ,  only when 
Marshall transferred his case to another lawyer--the only situation  
where he did not part ic ipate  in a cause to its conclusion— did his
c l ien ts '  cause suffer greatly .  In those cases, Marshall 's clients won
319only 48 percent of the time. These figures imply that Marshall 's
presence had a posit ive impact on the outcome of l i t ig a t io n .
Marshall was consistently successful in a l l  phases of his
practice. When he represented the p l a i n t i f f ,  he won nearly three-
quarters of his ef for ts  (not overly surprising when one recal ls  that
often the p l a i n t i f f  had an open-and-shut case). More revealing is the
fact  that the young advocate won nearly 60 percent of his cases while
320representing defendants. S im i la r ly ,  Marshall won consistently
321whether the action was an orig inal one or an appeal. Only in 
chancery cases ( in  a very limited sample) did he appear to s l ip ,  win­
ning only six times in th ir teen attempts. In actions at common law, he
322won— as usual — over two-thirds of his cases.
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While the impression may be r ising that John Marshall as a lawyer 
was omnicompetent, the surviving documentation of his legal practice 
shows just  as c lear ly  that he was sometimes less than perfect in the 
representation of his c l ients '  interests.
Marshall Mistakes
The most obvious of John Marshall 's fo ib les was a certain absent- 
mindedness which sometimes affected his c l ien ts '  in terests.  In March 
1785, for example, he admitted to a c l ien t  that "I  cannot inform you 
what papers I have respecting the suit you engaged me in unless I was 
in Richmond [Marshall was in Warrenton at the time] and I do not recol­
lect them a l l .  I had drawn the ejectment sometime past & meant to have
brought i t  up with me but when I searched I found I had l e f t  i t  behind
me. I w i l l  send i t  to the sh er i f f  as soon as possible from Rich-
323mond." Marshall was just  as careless with his c l ien ts '  money.
Twice in one year Marshall recorded that he had repaid a c l ien t  for
324"cash lost ,"  once the considerable sum of th irty-one pounds. At
times the attorney could not even recall  whom he represented. He once
wrote John Alexander that "I  remember to have had some conversation
with you while you were here about your suit with Bell f i e l d  but I do
not recollect  what i t  was. He has spoken to me since & has offered me
very high fees indeed to take his cause. I have refused him t i l l  I see
or hear from you because no consideration would tempt me to engage for
him i f  I had promised to appear for you. I do not recollect  or believe
325that I did, but I wish to be certain on the subject."
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Some of Marshall 's mistakes were of a more serious nature. In one 
of the chancery cases seeking to quiet t i t l e  to Fairfax lands following 
the decision of Hite v. F a i r fa x , Marshall 's c l ien t  had his case 
dismissed because Marshall 's b i l l  was unspecific as to the number of 
acres involved, where they were si tuated, and how his c l ien t  claimed or 
derived t i t l e .
John Marshall,  then, c lear ly  made mistakes during his professional 
career. Any evaluation of his work as a lawyer certa in ly  must recog­
nize th is fa c t .  I t  is to such a conclusion that we now turn.
Marshall as Lawyer
Concrete evidence of John Marshall 's a b i l i t i e s  has been presented, 
as well as examples of his miscues. In the end, however, an opinion on 
his true legal capab i l i t ies  must go far  beyond such isolated scraps of 
evidence, and enter the realm of subject iv i ty .  One can admire the deft  
handling of complicated and disputed cross-remainders in an action such 
as Ashton v. West, or Marshall 's mastery of technical legal arguments 
over the reversion of slaves by a residuary clause in a w i l l ,  as in 
Dudley v_. Crump, without being able to quantify the degree of John 
Marshall 's expertise. Certainly  such actions as that of Governor 
Randolph in transferr ing his practice to young Marshall speak well of 
his contemporaries' opinion of his a b i l i t i e s .  But the historian two 
centuries a f ter  the fact  can only assert that the surviving documenta­
tion of the f i r s t  eight years of John Marshall 's law practice gives the 
impression that John Marshall had indeed earned the appellation of 
"good lawyer."
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This study began with the oft-repeated ta le  of the old farmer who 
refused to believe that John Marshall could be a good lawyer. Of 
course the old gent was subsequently proven quite wrong. The purpose 
of th is study has been to remove the treatment of Marshall 's law prac­
t ice  from this level of anecdote and bring i t  into the realm of the 
fac tua l .  We have, as i t  were, "peeked over John Marshall 's shoulder" 
to see him at work, and have attempted to uncover the "nuts and bolts" 
of his law practice. This is key to better understanding of a man 
whose legal ideas and atti tudes were la te r  to shape a nation. We have 
also il luminated the nature of the practice of law in general in late  
eighteenth-century V irg in ia .  A further  understanding of that practice  
is important, not only for legal historians, but for a l l  historians of 
America's early national period. In his study of V i rg in ia 's  legal com­
munity in that period, A. G. Roeber concluded that "the lawyers and 
judges of V irg in ia  had become an e l i t e ,  an aristocracy of ta lent  which
grew out of and replaced the aristocracy of the Byrds, Carters [and]
328Ludwells . . . ." Certainly by the mid-nineteenth century those
who practised law had become the most powerful class in society. De
Tocqueville agreed that they, rather than the r ich ,  were the a r is to -
329crats of the United States. Any class as powerful as th is de­
serves and requires close scrutiny. Appreciating the daily work of 
leading lawyers such as John Marshall is the f i r s t  step in under­
standing how men of his i lk  came to dominate and shape American society 
through much of i ts  subsequent history.
APPENDIX 
A NOTE ON SOURCES AND METHOD
The preceding analysis of John Marshall 's law practice requires a 
br ie f  summary of the methodology underlying i t .  Making e x p l ic i t  the 
approach taken in the co l lec t ion ,  organization and evaluation of the 
documentation underlying Marshall 's practice should be helpful not only 
in the appraisal of the present work, but also in suggesting a point of 
departure for  further  work on the practice of law in the early national 
period.
The basic source used was the f i r s t  volume of The Papers of John 
Marshal 1, containing documents, correspondence, and a rendering of Mar­
sha l l 's  account book through June of 1788. This was greatly  supple­
mented by the accompanying manuscript records (declarations, answers, 
judgments and the l ik e )  which have been collected by the editors of the 
Papers of John Marshall. In addit ion, the court records from the re le ­
vant d i s t r i c t  courts — primari ly  the Fredericksburg D is t r ic t  Court, 
where Marshall la ter  practiced — were u t i l i z e d .  On occasion, there 
are citat ions in th is  study to the records of various other d is t r ic t  
courts where a Marshall case was subsequently transferred. This was 
done sparingly, since Marshall was no longer handling the cases in 
those courts. But when those court records best exemplified the type 
of a c t iv i t ie s  in which Marshall engaged (pr imar i ly  in the " t r i a l  
practice" segment of the study), they were cited as i l lu s t r a t i v e .
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In addition to the t rad i t iona l  " l i te ra ry"  approach to the sources, 
the methodological core of the analysis rests upon the u t i l i z a t io n  of 
the computer to assist in the categorization and evaluation of the 
applicable information. The f i r s t  step was to create a code book.
This document was in essence a l is t ing  of the categories of information 
(or "variables") that the sources generated. For instance, one va r i ­
able was the court in which Marshall appeared, another whether i t  was a 
case under the common law or in chancery, and so fo rth .  Once the va r i ­
ables had been determined and label led,  a l l  possible permutations of 
each were l is ted and assigned a numerical value. For example, under 
the variable "JM result" were l is ted  the following: "1 = won case; 2 =
lost case; 0 = unknown resu lt ."
Having completed the code book, the next step was to create a com­
puter program to perform the sort of analyses desired. This was accom­
plished through the u t i l i z a t io n  of the "S ta t is t ica l  Analysis System," a 
powerful s ta t is t ic a l  package that allows the user to mold a program 
which conforms to the specific  requirements of the current study. For 
purposes of the analysis of Marshall 's law practice, the most important 
s ta t is t ic a l  tools needed were "frequency distr ibutions" and "bivaria te  
analysis." A frequency d is tr ibut ion is simply a table that reveals the 
number of times a given action occurred, and its percentage of the 
whole. For example, under the variable "side represented," the f r e ­
quency table might show that Marshall represented p la in t i f f s  15 times 
or in 75 percent of the cases, and defendants 5 times for 25 percent of 
the t o t a l .  Bivariate analysis is the combination of two variables in 
tabular form. For instance, a bivar iate table might demonstrate how 
often Marshall won or lost a case depending upon whether he represented
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the p l a i n t i f f  or the defendant. The other s ta t is t ic a l  approach often 
used in th is study was simple averaging — such as the "average" 
duration of a case in l i t ig a t io n .
Once the code book was complete and the computer program in place, 
i t  was a re la t iv e ly  simple ( i f  time consuming and boring) task to 
"code" the information from the sources for computer use. I t  was essen­
t i a l l y  a matter of going through the one-thousand-odd cases contained 
in Marshall 's papers and account book, and placing the appropriate 
numerical value for each variable on "code sheets." These sheets, in 
turn, served as the basis for  typing or "punching" a series of computer 
cards which could then be run through the computer. The result  was a 
printout containing the desired information concerning Marshall 's law 
practice.
I t  should be noted, however, that converting the information 
gleaned from the documents of Marshall 's law practice into categories 
useful in the analysis of that practice was not always easy. For 
example, i t  was sometimes d i f f i c u l t  (p a r t ic u la r ly  with respect to cases 
appearing in Marshall 's account book) to ascertain in which court a 
cause had been heard. The rule always followed in u t i l i z in g  the source 
material was th is :  i f  the sources did not y ie ld  a clear basis for any
categorization, that source would not be used for purposes of the analy­
s is .  Thus i f  i t  was not obvious whether or not Marshall collaborated 
with other attorneys in a part icu lar  case, that case was not used at 
a l l  in calculations involving that variable .  This conservative 
approach to the sources resulted in smaller samples than might other­
wise have been enjoyed, but the in teg r i ty  of the analysis was thereby 
preserved.
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Despite adhering to this conservative approach to the source mate­
r i a l ,  there were inevitably  occasions when certain suppositions had to 
be made concerning the information generated by the sources. These 
should be made e x p l ic i t .  The following paragraphs address the 
rat ionale for the most important of these suppositions.
Perhaps the most troublesome problem generated by the sources, and 
the one least s a t is fa c to r i ly  resolved, was the ident i f ica t ion  of Mar­
sha l l 's  m i l i ta ry  c l ie n te le .  Of course some of his m i l i ta ry  clients  
were easily ident i f ied  in the documents. Others were more d i f f i c u l t  to 
trace.  I t  was decided to include as m i l i ta ry  clients a l l  those who Mar­
shall had recorded as having a m i l i ta ry  rank, such as "Capt. Williams" 
or "Colo. Kennedy." The risk in th is is the possible confusion of 
active m i l i ta ry  types with mere m i l i t i a  o f f ice rs .  Counterbalancing 
this  risk is the fact that ,  in a period so soon af ter  a major m i l i ta ry  
engagement, i t  is l ik e ly  that even m i l i t i a  of f icers  had recently seen 
active duty. Moreover, since only of f icers  tend to appear in the 
records, the odds are that any estimation of Marshall 's m i l i ta ry  
c l ien te le  is underestimated in any event.
In the same vein, there were other occasions when categorizing the 
nature of the c l ien t  required a supposition. For instance, Marshall 
was assumed to be representing a decedent's estate when the documents 
made that c lear ,  or when his account book entry indicated that he was 
representing an "executor" or "administrator." S im i lar ly ,  he was 
deemed to represent a commercial c l ien t  when he became involved in a 
c lear ly  commercial-type of a c t iv i t y ,  such as the construction of a 
commercial contract, or when his c l ien t  was described as a company or a 
partnership.
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The allocation of Marshall 's practice into several overarching 
categories required a similar  categorization of the source materia l.
The dist inction between his cases in common law and chancery was 
normally clear cut. Often the nature of the document, such as a 
declaration or a b i l l ,  made the type of action obvious. Marshall also 
commonly annotated the entries in his account book by noting when a 
case was in "chancery." Further actions of th is  type were manifest by 
the ir  very nature - -  such as Marshall 's recording of fees for "injunc­
tions" and the l ik e .  Cases not c lear ly  actions in equity were deemed 
to come within the common law. Enough supporting documentation exists 
to reinforce the v a l id i t y  of th is  treatment of the sources.
Likewise, in determining whether a cause of action was original or 
appel late, a similar  approach was taken. The most obvious method was 
to look to the specific evidence of th is contained in the case 
records. Beyond that ,  Marshall 's account book gives a further  
indication. He consistently noted in his entries when a cause was on 
"appeal." Moreover, there were other references to appeal-related  
actions, such as "supersedeas" and " c e r t io r a r i ." I t  was assumed that 
entries not cited as appellate actions were orig inal in nature. Again, 
where supplementary documentation permitted th is  approach to be 
double-checked, i t  held up wel l .
Analysis of Marshall 's l i t ig a t io n  practice called forth a number of 
"judgment calls" concerning the information contained in the sources.
An example is the matter of the court in which Marshall appeared. In 
the majority of cases, this information was simply not ascertainable. 
This variable was u t i l i z e d  only when the documents spec i f ica l ly  named 
the court in which a cause was t r ie d .
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The analysis of Marshall 's representation of p l a i n t i f f  or defendant 
required a structured reading of the sources. Of course, th is fact was 
an integral part of the court documents which have survived. For other 
sources this information was not so obvious. Fortunately, in his 
account book Marshall consistently followed a convention in the making 
of his entr ies.  When he represented the p l a i n t i f f  (say, a c l ien t  named 
Smith), he recorded the suit as "Smith v. Jones." When his c l ien t  
(Smith) was the defendant, Marshall wrote the entry as "Smith ad sectam 
[a t  the suit of] Jones." Once again there are enough cases with supple­
mentary documentation to confirm this presumption as a valid approach 
to the source materia l.
In categorizing the causes of action which Marshall encountered in 
his l i t ig a t io n  practice, care was taken to record them, in the f i r s t  
instance at least,  in Marshall 's own terms, e .g . ,  in "debt," "case," or 
"indebitatus assumpsit." Where possible, the subsequent description of 
his practice placed Marshall 's own categorizations in the proper legal 
context (such as when actions in "case" in re a l i t y  overlapped with 
those in "indebitatus assumpsit.")
F in a l ly ,  i t  was sometimes possible to determine whether a cause was 
heard by the bench or t r ied  before a jury .  This variable was u t i l i z e d  
only when the documentation made this clear — such as when an argument 
was presented to the bench on appeal, or when the records revealed the 
naming of a ju ry ,  i ts  verd ict ,  or the l ik e .
This br ie f  sketch of the methodology and approach to the sources is
intended only to highlight the most important aspects of the substruc­
ture of this analysis. Anyone pursuing an expanded or related study 
should of course develop his or her own conceptualizations, approaches, 
and assumptions. I t  is hoped, however, that th is study of Marshall 's  
practice w i l l  serve as a f i r s t  step in the much-needed understanding of 
law practice in the early national period. As the conclusion to this  
study suggests, lawyers were to play an increasingly dominant role in 
nineteenth-century American l i f e .  I t  behooves us to make every e f fo r t  
to see these men in th e ir  own terms; that is ,  within the frame of
reference of the ir  day-to-day professional existence.
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receiving for other cases; therefore, as a percentage of income, Mar­
sha l l 's  receipts for "advice" remained remarkably stable. In 1784,
4.3% of his cases involved advice to c l ien ts ,  while 3.6% of his income 
was thus a t t r ibu tab le .  In 1785, the figures are 4.2% and 3.5%; in 
1786, 9.8% and 4.4%; in 1787, 9.3% and 4.4%; in 1788, 12.8% and 6.1%.
For the entire  period, Marshall saw 8.3% of his legal a c t iv i t ie s  a t t r i b ­
utable to advice, while only 4.3% of his income was so derived.
119 Supra, pp. 22-23.
"^Account Book, May 26, 1786 [Marshall,  1: 354-55].
■^Marshall to John Alexander, Feb. 10, 1787 [Marshall ,  1: 203].
122Marshall to Leven Powell, Dec 9, 1783 [Marshall ,  1: 108-09].
123Marshall to William Branch Giles, Sept. 22, 1786 [Marshall,  1: 
165-69].
96.
125Marshall to John Breckinridge, May 1, 1787 [Marshall ,  1:232].
"^Marshall  to Breckinridge, Sept. 28, 1787 [Marshall ,  1: 235].
127Account Book, Feb. 21, 1787 [Marshall ,  1: 371].
■ ^A rb i t ra t ion  award, Dec. 28, 1786 [Marshall ,  1: 198].
129Dec. 24, 1786 [Marshall ,  1: 193].
■^Account Book, Nov. 9, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 397 n. 63].
131Out of 1094 cases, 712 c lear ly  involved l i t ig a t io n .  This is 
all  the more impressive when i t  is recalled that the courts of V irg in ia  
were closed unti l  1782, and that Marshall 's cryptic recordkeeping cer­
ta in ly  under-reports l i t ig a t io n - re la te d  a c t iv i ty .
132 Marshall earned £877-0/4 representing defendants, and £867-4/2 
representing p l a i n t i f f s .  The percentage distr ibution is precisely the 
same as before: 49.7% for  p l a i n t i f f s ;  50.3% for defendants.
133 For appellant,  55 out of 102 appeals, or 53.9%; for appellee,
47 of 102, or 46.1%. Three of Marshall 's appellant clients had been 
p la in t i f f s  below, and 2 defendants (the information is not available in 
the other cases). For appellees, 4 had been p l a i n t i f f s ;  2 defendants.
134Marshall represented the p l a i n t i f f  20 times (55.5%) and the 
defendant 16 times (44.4%). He represented the p l a i n t i f f  10 times in 
actions to quiet t i t l e  (ch ie f ly  in the aftermath of the Hite _v. Fairfax  
case [ supra, p. 22]; in ejectment actions, he represented the p l a i n t i f f  
6 times, the defendant 14.
135 He represented the p l a i n t i f f  12 times, the defendant 18.
■^Marshall represented the p l a i n t i f f  15 times (39.5%), and the 
defendant 23 times (60.5%).
137Marshall 's records l i s t  52 cases described as one form or 
another of "debt" actions; another 6 cases were based on assumpsit, 14 
were in detinue, while 15 involved replevin of goods. At least 15 
actions sounded in trespass on the case, but in a l l  probabil i ty  not a l l  
of these were grounded on a conception of "owing." Altogether [d is ­
counting actions in "case"] 87 cases, or 34.7% of the total f e l l  into 
this category. I t  should be noted that a very few cases (only one was 
found in Marshall 's practice) sounded in "covenant' - - an action based on 
a sealed document. The action of debt was preferable.
1 3ftThey constituted 52 of 251 to ta l  cases, or 20.7%.
139 Black's Law Dict ionary, rev. 4th ed., s.v. "debt."
97.
140Fredericksburg D is t r ic t  Court, D is t r ic t  Court Records, 
1789-1792, 4-8 (V i rg in ia  State L ibrary) .
141Of the 52 debt cases, 3 were clearly  based on a b i l l  of ex­
change; f u l l y  29 were grounded on a bond.
142S. F. C. Mi Isom, Histor ical  Foundations of the Common Law, 2d 
ed. (Toronto: Butterworth1s, 1981), 258, 250-51.
143Account Book, Sept. 3, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 309].
144Staunton D is t r ic t  Court, Order Book, 1789-1793, 38 (Va. State 
L ib ra ry ) .
145 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "assumpsit."
146Six appear, or 6.8%: three are labelled "indebitatus assump­
s i t , "  while others are described as "assumpsit on a promissory note," 
or just  "assumpsit." Note the small nature of the sample. I t  is 
suggestive only.
147Tucker-Coleman Papers, Swem Library, College of William and 
Mary [Marshall,  1: 221-30].
148Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "detinue;" Milsom, 263. Note 
that in detinue the idea of "wrong" as well as "owing" creeps in.
149There were 14 of 87, or 16.0%.
150Five of the 14 detinue cases were for slaves. Regarding the 
mare, see Ware v. Conway, Fredericksburg D is t r ic t  Court, Dist . Ct. 
Records, 1789-1792, 45-46 (Va. State Library) .
151 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "replevin."
152Stringer v. Burton, Accomack D is t r ic t  Court, Order Book, 
1791-1794, 259-64 (Va. State Library ) .
153Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "replevin bond."
154Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "case," "trespass on the case."
155 Bushrod Washington, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in 
the Court of Appeals of V irg in ia  (Richmond, 1798), 1: 190-92 (1793) 
[Marshall ,  1: 380].
1 56 Tucker-Coleman Papers [Marshall,  1:215-18].
157Richard Henderson, et a l . y .  Wi 11 iam Brooke, Winchester Dis­
t r i c t  Court, Frederick County Superior Court Order Book, 1789-1793, 52 
(Va. State L ibrary) .
98.
158A tota l  of 44 of the 251 ident i f iab le  causes of action (17.5%) 
related to land.
159There were 23 of the 44 t o t a l ,  or 52.3%.
160 Black1s Law Dict ionary, s.v. "ejectment."
■ ^ D i s t r i c t  Court Order Book, Northumberland County, 1789-1793,
72 (Va. State Library).
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Ten of the 44 total were actions to quiet t i t l e ,  or 22.7%.
163 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "quiet."
164 See supra, p. 22. Marshall,  1: 152.
165 See supra, pp. 19-20. Eight of 44 cases (18.1%) were caveats.
■^A to ta l  of 52 of the 251 ident i f iab le  causes of action (20.7%) 
were "personal" causes.
167 A total  of 21 of 52 cases (40.4%) were labelled trespass,  
assault and battery. See Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "trespass vi et 
armis."
168Robertson y. Hobson, Prince Edward D is t r ic t  Court Records at 
Large, 1789-1792, 282 (Va. State Library) .
169See Black1s Law Dict ionary, s.v. "trespass on the case;" 15 of 
52 causes (28.8%) sounded in case.
"^See Black 1 s Law Diet ionary, s.v. "slander;" Kel 1 urn y. West, 
Accomack County D is t r ic t  Court Order Book, 1789-1791, 4-7; Ib id . ,  
1789-1797, 21; Six of 52 cases (11.5%) were in slander.
171There were 10 citat ions to "habeas corpus," or 19.2% of the 
personal causes. See Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "habeas corpus," 
"habeas corpus ad faciendum et recipiendum."
172These groupings account for 72.9% of the t o t a l .  This under­
estimates the s i tuat ion ,  since many of the remaining causes are 
non-specific in Marshall 's records.
173 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "pleading."
174In 4 Call 99, 102 (1787).
175 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "declaration."
176See supra, p. 7. Although Marshall 's Account Book l is ts  sev­
eral purchases of sheafs of preprinted declarations, the only completed 
one remaining in the extant papers for this period is in the case of 
Havely v. Hammersly. See Marshall,  1: 234.
99.
1 77Northumberland D is t r ic t  Court Order Book, 1789-1793, 193 (Va. 
State L ibrary) .
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Casebook, Tucker-Coleman Papers [Marshall,  1: 239].
179 Black's Law Dict ionary, s .v . ,  "answer."
180See Milsom, 47-48.
181A general denial was pleaded in 12 of the 22 cases (54.5%).
Among such denials were pleas of "not g u i l ty ,"  "non assumpsit," "non 
det inet ,"  and "nil d i e i t . "
■^A tota l  of 7 of the 22 cases, or 31.8%.
183Two cases (9.1%) alleged insuff ic ient  information, while one 
asserted the use of improper procedures.
184There were 83 cases c lear ly  at issue (90.2%); 8 had the issue 
confessed (8.77%); while only 1 (1.1%) resulted in a default judgment.
185 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "b a i l ."
186Fredericksburg D is t r ic t  Court, D is t r ic t  Court Records,
1789-1792, 221 (Va. State L ibrary);  Casebook, Tucker-Coleman Papers 
[Marshall,  1: 209].
1 87Prince Edward D is t r ic t  Court Records at Large, 1789-1792, 203 
(Va. State Library) .
1 oo
Prince Edward D is t r ic t  Court Records at Large, 1789-1792, 430 
(Va. State Library ) .
1 RQFredericksburg D is t r ic t  Court Records, 1789-1792, 210-11; Acco­
mack D is t r ic t  Court Order Book, 1789-^-1791, 36-38.
190See, e .g . ,  James v. Cobbs, Prince Edward D is t r ic t  Court Order 
Book, 1789-1792, 112 (Va. State L ibrary);  Winchester D is t r ic t  Court, 
Frederick County Superior Court Order Book, 1789-1793, 354 (Va. State 
L ib ra ry ) .
191 I b i d . , 127.
1 Q?James _v. Cobbs, 115.
193Carr 's Exrs. _v. Lee* s Exrs. , Prince Will iam County D is t r ic t  
Court Order Book, 1794-1798, 187 (Va. State L ibrary ) .  See also Robert- 
son v. Hobson, D is t r ic t  Court Records at Large, Prince Edward County, 
1789-1792, 282-84 (Va. State Library) .
194Prince Edward D is t r ic t  Court Order Book, 1789-1792, 131 (Va. 
State Library) .
^ D i s t r i c t  Court Law Orders A, 1789-1793, 58, 156 (Va. State 
Library) .
100.
196 In the 30 cases where continuances can be determined, the 
median was 5 continuances; the modal category was 6 such delays (23.3% 
of the t o t a l ) .
197The average f i l i n g  date was A p r i l ,  1786. The average termina­
tion date was October, 1790. Because of the delays involved with the 
transit ion to the d is t r ic t  courts, this probably overstates the case.
198JM to Batta i le  Muse, April 1, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 207].
199See Casebook, Tucker-Coleman Papers, Swem Library, College of 
William and Mary.
^^The nature of Marshall 's collaboration with other attorneys is 
discernible in 85 cases. Of these he was sole counsel 75 times (88.2%) 
and co-counsel 10 times (11.8%). On appeal, Marshall collaborated in 7 
cases, and worked alone in 12.
201 Casebook, Tucker-Coleman Papers [Marshall,  1: 212-15].
202 See Brickhouse y. Brickhouse, Accomack County D is t r ic t  Court 
Order Book, 1789-1791, 36; Keisel v. Donnel1y, Staunton D is t r ic t  Court 
Order Book, 1789-1793, 107-8; 1789-1797, 42, 56 (Va. State Library ) .
203See Baker, 87.
204Marshall transferred 26 cases (34.7%) of his cases in this
manner.
205Accomack D is t r ic t  Court Order Book, 1791-1794, 259-64 (Va.
State Library) .
^^Casebook, Tucker-Coleman Papers [Marshall,  1: 211-12].
207Kirman Holmes & Company v. Duncan, Casebook, Tucker-Coleman 
Papers [Marshall,  1: 250-51].
208Dudley v. Crump, Casebook, Tucker-Coleman Papers [Marshall ,  1: 
186-88].
209At 4 Call 89 (1786).
210 Casebook, Tucker-Coleman Papers [Marshall,  1:207-09].
211Latham v. Gaines, Fredericksburg D is t r ic t  Court Record Book, 
1789-1792, 112-16 (Va. State L ibrary ) .
212 Citations are found in 30 of 62 cases, or 48.4%.
213There were 21 citat ions to cases in the King's Bench; 4 to 
Chancery; 2 to the Exchequer Chambers; and 1 each to Nisi Prius and 
Common Pleas.
101.
214Sir  William Black stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 
. . . (Oxford, 1765-1769); Sir  Edward Coke, F i rs t  In s t i tu te  (London, 
1625); Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgment of the Law . . . ,  3d ed.
(London, 1766-1769); Henry Swinburne, A Treatise on Testaments and Last 
Wills  . . . ,  5th ed. (London, 1728); Christopher A. German, Doctor and 
Student (London, 1761).
215 Staunton D is t r ic t  Court Order Book, 1789-1793, 107-8;
1789-1797, 42, 56 (Va. State Library) .
21 fiCasebook, Tucker-Coleman Papers [Marshall,  1: 218-21].
217 Ib id . [Marshall,  1: 184-85]. See also Braxton v. Beal 1 [Mar­
s ha l l ,  1: 221-30], where Judge Mercer overruled attorney citat ions to 
English precedent.
218Robertson's W i l l ,  Casebook, Tucker-Coleman Papers [Marshall,
1: 185].
219Black' s Law Dict ionary, s.v. "judgment."
220Of 75 cases where i t  can be determined, the court decided the
case 47 times (62.6%) while a jury  was involved 28 times (37.3%).
221The judges were unanimous 43 of 47 times, or 91.5%.
222 McKewn y. McKeen, Frederick County Superior Court Order Book,
1789-1793, 66 (Va. State L ibrary) .
223Accomack D is t r ic t  Court Order Book, 1791-1794, 259-64 (Va.
State L ibrary) .
224 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "verdict ."
^ ^ See 1 Washington, 190-92.
226Twenty-two of 32 judgments matched the orig inal declaration 
(68.7%); 8 awards were for less than the p l a i n t i f f  demanded (25%); 2 
(6.2%) were for more.
227There were 34 instances of awards in pounds, sh i l l ings and 
pence "current money;" 1 each of "specie" and "s ter l ing ."  Two cases 
were in dollars and cents, and 8 were in land acreage.
228Campbel1 y .  Reid, Frederick County Superior Court Order Book, 
1789-1793, 60-61 (Va. State L ibrary) .  Note that 20 of 32 cases (62.5%) 
involved "judgment bonds."
229 Frederick County Superior Court Order Book, 1789-1793, 57 (Va. 
State Library) .
230I b i d . ,  127.
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231 Frederick County Superior Court Order Book, 1789-1793, 24 (Va. 
State L ibrary ) .  Costs were also assessed on appeal; see Moore v.
Moore, ib id . ,  193.
232The p l a i n t i f f  was assessed costs 36 out of 46 times (78.3%);
defendants 9 times (19.6%); costs were shared once.
233Nominal damages were awarded in 12 of 14 cases, or 85.7%.
234Thirty-two of 35 cases (91.4%) were of this nature.
235 Fredericksburg D is t r ic t  Court Records, 1789-1792, 498-99 (Va. 
State L ibrary) .
^^^Account Book, July 5, 1785 [Marshall ,  1: 334].
237The p l a i n t i f f  won judgment 39 of 57 times (68.4%).
^®The p l a i n t i f f  won 26 of 28 "debt on bond" cases— 92.8%. Like­
wise, the p l a i n t i f f  won 3 of 4 ejectment cases, and a l l  of the suits to 
quiet t i t l e .
239Payne v. George, D is t r ic t  Court Order Book, Northumberland 
County, 1787-1793, 72 (Va. State Library) .
240 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. " f i e r i  fac ias ."
241 Account Book, December 1786 [Marshall ,  1: 368].
242 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "forthcoming bond;" Marshall made 
15 references to "replevy bonds" in his Account Book.
243 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. " in junction."
244George Wythe, Dec is ions of Cases in V i rq in ia  by the High Court 
of Chancery (Char lo t tesv i l le :  The Michie Co., 1900), 47; 3 Call 531-37
(1790).
245 Black's Law Dict ionary, s.v. "supersedeas;" see Joseph v.
Bratton, Staunton D is t r ic t  Court Order Book, 1789-1797, 39 (Va. State 
Library ) .  Marshall 's records include 27 references to supersedeas pro­
ceedings .
246See, e .g . ,  Brickhouse v. Brick house, Accomack D is t r ic t  Court 
Order Boook, 1789-1791, 36, 39 (Va. State Library) .
247 Eppes v. Tucker, Court of Appeals Order Book, I I ,  2 (Va. State 
L ib ra ry ) .
248See, e .g . ,  Land Bounty C e r t i f ica te  [Marshall,  1: 107].
24 9Power of Attorney, March 12, 1788 [Marshall ,  1: 250].
250 Supra, pp. 20-21. See, e .g . ,  Marshall to Arthur Lee, Feb. 26, 
1783. [Marshall ,  1: 97].
103.
^ M a r s h a l l  to James Monroe, Jan. 3, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 113-14];  
Ib id . ,  Feb. 7, 1784 [Marshall ,  1: 115]; Ib id . ,  Dec. 2, 1784 [Marshall,  
1: 132].
252B i l l  of Sale, July 3, 1787 [Marshall,  1:232-33].
253Marshall to William Heth, Mar. 1, 1783 [Marshall,  1: 98].
254Marshall to James Monroe, Feb. 24, 1784 [Marshall ,  1: 116].
255I b i d . , April  17, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 120-21].
2^Marshall  to Arthur Lee, April 7, 1784 [Marshall ,  1: 118-20].
2^^£1210-18/4. See Account Book, Dec. 1785 [Marshall,  1: 346].
2^Marshall  to Will iam Heth, Mar. 1, 1783 [Marshall ,  1: 98].
2^Account Book, Jan. 18, 1785 [Marshall,  1: 320]; ib id . ,  April 
29, 1785 [Marshall,  1: 331].
2^Marshall  to James Monroe, Jan. 3, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 113].
261 I b i d . , Dec. 12, 1783 [Marshall,  1: 111].
262 Ib id . ,  May 15, 1784 [Marshall ,  1:123].
2^Marshall  to John Alexander, Feb. 10, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 203].
264Marshall to James Wilkinson, Jan. 5, 1787 [Marshall ,  1:
199-200].
2^Marshall  to George Muter, Jan. 7, 1785 [Marshall,  1: 134].
2^Marshall  to William Heth, Mar. 1, 1783 [Marshall,  1: 98-99].
2^ P e t i t i o n  of John Kel ly ,  Nov. 22, 1787 [Marshall , 1: 242-43];  
see also Petit ion of James Markham, Nov. 3, 1787 [Marshall ,  1: 241-42],
2^Council of State Opinion, Feb. 20, 1783 [Marshall,  1: 96-97].
2fi9Report to the Council of State, Mar. 25, 1783 [Marshall 1: 
99-100].
270Marshall to James Monroe, April 17, 1784 [Marshall,  1:
120- 21] .
271 Marshall to Arthur Lee, April 17, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 118-20].
272 Beveridge, 1:164; S t i te s ,  20.
273 He attended 78 days in two sessions in 1782; 139 days for the 
sessions of 1784, averaging 108.5 days per year.
104.
274Beveridge, 1: 202, 204, 209; S t i te s ,  21.
275 Legis lat ive B i l l ,  Nov. 30, 1782 [Marshall ,  1: 89-91].
^ ^ L e g is la t iv e  B i l l ,  Dec. 1, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 128-29]; ib id . ,
Dec. 25, 1786 [Marshall,  1: 193-97]; ib id . ,  Jan. 3, 1788 [Marshall ,  1: 
248].
277Baker, 91, 94.
278Letter  to Commissioners on I l l i n o i s  Accounts, Dec. 31, 1787 
[Marshall,  1: 245].
279Marshal1, 1: 170.
opi
Acknowledgment, Dec. 31, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 246].
282Marshal1, 1: 169-70.
o o p
Minute Book, Richmond City Hustings Court [Marshall,  1: 
173-174].
284Marshall ,  1:101
288M i l i t a r y  Land Warrant, Nov. 30, 1782 [Marshall,  1: 91-92].
288Marshall,  1: 100-104. See, for  example, the history of "Land 
Office Warrant No. 4583," in Marshall, 1: 104-107.
28^Marshall obtained 41,503 1/2 acres for himself, 108,525 1/2 
for his fa ther ,  and 1700 for his brother. See Marshall, 1: 102-103.
288Marshall realized £634-3/9 on his warrants. See Marshall, 1: 
319 n. 41.
289 Deed, Thomas Marshall to John Marshall,  March 16, 1785 [Mar­
sha l l ,  1: 136-38]; deed Aquila Dyson to John Marshall,  Oct. 18, 1787 
[Marshall,  1: 240]; deed, Jaquelin Ambler to John Marshall, March 15, 
1785 [Marshall,  1: 135-36].
290Marshall invested £84 in the Potomac River Company, and £12 in 
the James River Company.
291 See, e .g . ,  Account Book, Jan. 14, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 299];  
ib id . ,  Oct. 12, 1784 [Marshall ,  1: 313 n. 11]; ib id ,  Sept. 13, 1785 
[Marshall,  1: 339]; ib id . ,  May, 1784 [Marshall ,  1: 303 n. 58].
292 I b id . ,  Feb. 7, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 372 n. 66]; Subscription, 
Jan. 9, 1788 [Marshall ,  1: 248-49].
293
S u b s c r ip t io n ,  A p r i l  13,  1785 [M a r s h a l l ,  1: 140 -4 2 ] .
105.
294 Commission, July 5, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 233].
^^Marshall to William Pierce, Feb. 12, 1783 [Marshall,  1: 96]. 
Marshall l is ts  9 entries for the "Assembly" or for "balls" to ta l l in g  
£9-5.
296Marshall l is ts  six contributions to "clubs" to ta l l in g  £2-16.
He paid £5-15/8 for six barbecues.
297Account Book, May 25, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 383]. In a l l ,  Mar­
shall contributed to the Jockey Club £12-12. See ib id . ,  May 25, 1785 
[Marshall,  1: 330 n. 85].
298Account Book, June 22, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 305]; ib id . ,  March, 
1784 [Marshall,  1: 302]; ib id . ,  June 12, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 385]; 
ib id . ,  Mar. 20, 1788 [Marshall,  1: 404]. In t o t a l ,  Marshall lost £72-8 
and won £23-16.
299Account Book, Feb. 12, 1785 [Marshall,  1: 322 n. 54],
Marshall recorded no less than twenty-five of such purchases, 
to ta l l in g  £104-9/4.
^ M a r s h a l l  to James Monroe, Feb. 24, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 116].
302Marshall to George Muter, Feb. 11, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 204].
^^Marshall to William Pierce, Feb. 12, 1783 [Marshall,  1: 95].
'^M arsha l l  to James Monroe, Feb 24, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 117].
305See 11 Hening 182 (1782); see also 7 Hening 124, 400 (1761).
398Account Book, Dec. 4, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 318]; ib id . ,  Sept.
25, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 310 n. 92].
307Notice of Richmond lawyers, Virg inia Gazette and Weekly 
Advertiser, Nov. 11, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 126-27].
308Receipt, Dec. 21, 1785 [Marshall,  1: 145].
3(39Account Book, Oct. 26, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 314]; ib id . ,  July 
20, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 306-07].
338Ib id . ,  Oct. 8, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 393]; ib id . ,  April 2, 1788 
[Marshall,  1: 405].
311 I b i d . , Sept. 18, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 390]; ib id . ,  May 26, 1788 
[Marshal 1 , 1 :  411].
312See, e .g . ,  ib id . ,  May 2, 1788 [Marshall,  1: 410].
3131 b i d . , Aug. 1 ,  1785 [M a r s h a l l ,  1:  335] .
106.
3~^ S e e , e .g . ,  ib id . ,  Oct. 1783 [Marshall,  1: 295 n. 19]. The 
total  income from this source was £102-10 in 1783, £119-14 in 1784, and 
£177-16 in 1785.
3^3Pay voucher, Nov. 27, 1784 [Marshall,  1: 128].
316In 1782, he earned £44-18; in 1784, £91-13/6; in 1785,
£23-6/6. These records are certa in ly  incomplete.
3^ I n  1783, Marshall had 6 cases and earned £15-3/9. In 1784, 
the figures were 116 and £419-7/4; in 1785, 216 and £750-3/5; in 1786, 
224 and £781-11/10; in 1787 355 and £1143-61; in the f i r s t  half  of 
1788, 148 and £506-18/11. In a l l ,  Marshall handled 1065 cases and 
earned £3616-11/4.
3^3Marshall to Beverly Randolph, Aug. 6, 1787 [Marshall,  1: 234].
319Where the result  is known, Marshall won 65 of 97 cases, or 
67.0%. When he was sole counsel, he won 32 of 51, or 62.7%. When he 
collaborated, he won 7 of 9 (77.7%). When the case was transferred to 
another attorney, Marshall 's side won 11, lost 12 (47.8%).
33(3Marshall won 26 of 36 for p l a in t i f f s  (72.2%), and 21 of 36 for  
defendants (58.3%).
321 In orig inal actions, Marshall won 43 of 68 (63.2%); on appeal, 
he won 19 of 26 (73.0%).
He won 59 cases and lost 25, for 68.2%.
323Marshall to unknown person, March 17, 1785 [Marshall,  1:
138-39].
33^Account Book, March 30, 1785 [Marshall,  1: 324]; ib id . ,
April 10, 1785 [Marshall,  1: 325].
^ M a r s h a l l  to John Alexander, Feb. 10, 1787 [Marshall,  1:
203-04].
3^ Hyatt v. H i te 's Representatives [Marshall,  1: 190 n. 4] .
327Roeber, 254.
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